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Abstract—Security has become the primary concern in many
telecommunications industries today as risks can have high
consequences. Especially, as the core and enable technologies will
be associated with 5G network, the confidential information will
move at all layers in future wireless systems. Several incidents
revealed that the hazard encountered by an infected wireless
network, not only affects the security and privacy concerns,
but also impedes the complex dynamics of the communications
ecosystem. Consequently, the complexity and strength of security
attacks have increased in the recent past making the detection
or prevention of sabotage a global challenge.
From the security and privacy perspectives, this paper presents
a comprehensive detail on the core and enabling technologies,
which are used to build the 5G security model; network
softwarization security, PHY (Physical) layer security and 5G
privacy concerns, among others. Additionally, the paper includes
discussion on security monitoring and management of 5G net-
works. This paper also evaluates the related security measures
and standards of core 5G technologies by resorting to different
standardization bodies and provide a brief overview of 5G
standardization security forces. Furthermore, the key projects
of international significance, in line with the security concerns of
5G and beyond are also presented. Finally, a future directions
and open challenges section has included to encourage future
research.
Index Terms—Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC), Network
Function Virtualization (NFV), Network Security, Network Slic-
ing, Physical Layer Security (PLS), Privacy, Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) and Telecommunication, 5G.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of mobile networks offered to satisfy the
new demands for enhanced performance, portability, elasticity
and energy efficiency of novel network services. 5G mobile
networks adopt new networking concepts to further improve
these features [1]. The telecommunication standardization
bodies are working on integrating novel networking con-
cepts such as Software Defined Networking (SDN), Network
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Fig. 1. Four phases of Network Transformation towards Network Softwariza-
tion in 5G.
Function Virtualization (NFV), cloud computing, Multi-access
Edge Computing (MEC), Network Slicing (NS) concepts to
telecommunication networks [2], [3]. The target of such efforts
is to design a new softwarized mobile network. It will help
innovate and develop new network services to satisfy demand
for the evolving the future mobile networks. The SDN concept
proposes to decouple the control and data planes of networking
devices [4]. The network control and intelligence of SDN
based network are placed in a logically centralized controller.
Moreover, it can offer an abstract of the underlying network
infrastructure for the control functions and business application
layer. NFV proposes a novel approach to create, deploy and
manage networking services. This concept aims to decouple
the network functions from proprietary hardware in order to
run them as software instances [5]. Cloud computing and
MEC will provide on demand scalability for the networks [6],
[7]. Network slicing improves the support for different traffic
classes in 5G Network [8]. Protecting the security and privacy
have become the primary concerns in this new telecommuni-
cation networks as risks can have high consequences.
Fig. 1 illustrates the four phases of network softwarization
which paves the path towards 5G. It illustrates how above
technologies has enabled the deployment of softwarized 5G
network, spanning from inflexible fixed-mobile architecture
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF MAIN ACRONYMS.
Acronym Definition Acronym Definition
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project 5G Fifth Generation Wireless Network
AI Artificial Intelligence AN Artificial Noise
APT Advanced Persistent Threats AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
ABE Attribute Based Encryption ARPF Authentication Credential Repository and Processing function
ASON Automatically Switched Optical Network AUSF Authentication Server Function
BS Base Station CJ Cooperative Jamming
CR Cognitive Radio C-RAN Cloud Radio Access Network
CSI Channel State Information DoS Denial of Service
D2D Device-to-device DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DL Down-link DF Decode Forward
DREAMS Distributed Reputation Management System ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EST Effective secrecy throughput E2E End-to-end
ECG Electrocardiogram EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
FDD Frequency Division Duplex FMEC Fog and Mobile Edge Computing
GMPLS Generalized Multi-protocol Label Switching GDPR General Data Privacy Regulation
HLPSL High-level protocol specification Language HW-PS Hard-working path selection
HPN High Power Node HIP Host Identity Protocol
HD Half Duplex HetNet Heterogeneous Network
IIoT Industrial Internet of Things IoT Internet of Things
ITU-T International Telecommunication Union Telecom IDS Intrusion Detection System
ICT Information and Communication Technology IPWAVE Internet Protocol Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
KFDP Data based on Kalman filter KPTSABE Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
LPN Low Power node LDP Laplace mechanism for perturbed data
LTE Long Term Evolution LDPC Low Density Parity Check Codes
LBS Location Based Service MitM Man-in-the-middle
MANETs Mobile Ad hoc NETworks MRC Maximum Ratio Combining
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output mmWave Millimeter Wave
MEC Mobile Edge Computing MCC Mobile Cloud Computing
MLT Machine Learning Technique MPWG Mobile Platform Work Group
MRT Maximal Ratio Transmission MTC Machine-type communication
MSN Mobile Social Network mmWave millimeter Wave
mMTC massive Machine Type Communication NIST National Institutes of Standards and Technology
NGMN Next Generation Mobile Networks NS2 Network Simulator Version 2
NS Network Slicing NOMA Non Orthogonal Multiple Access
NVF Network Function Virtualization OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access
ONF Open Networking Foundation PASER Position-Aware Secure and Efficient mesh Routing
PBS Pico Base Station PLS Physical Layer Security
P2P Point to Point QoS Quality of Service
RA Radio Access RAN Radio Access Network
RFC Request For Comment RS Relay Station
SPA Shortest Path Algorithm SISO Single Input Single Output
SDN Software-Defined Networking SDMN Software-Defined Mobile Networking
SCP sequential convex programming SAF Security Anchor Function
SHFRS Soft Hesitant Fuzzy Rough Set SIC Successive Interference Cancellation
SDP Semi-definite Programming TDD Time Division Duplex
SEAF SEcurity Anchor Function SERA Secure Ergodic Resource Allocation
SRERA Secure Robust Ergodic Resource Allocation SEEM Secrecy Energy Efficiency Maximization
SOP Secrecy Outage Probability SWIPT Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer
SUPI Subscription Concealed Identifier SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier
TCG Trusted Computing Group UAV Unmanned Ariel Vehicles
UDM Unified Data Management UE User Equipment
URLLC Ultra Reliable and Low Latency Communication VEC Vehicular Edge Computing
VNF Virtual Network Functions WSN Wireless Sensor Networks
ZF Zero Forcing ZFBF Zero Forcing Beamforming
to a dynamic and agile software based network architecture.
These architectural changes in 5G are expected to fuel the
digital transformation that all the industry is witnessing [9].
This will also result in generating new service models and
new value chains which will lead to a significant socio-
economic impact. The definitions of frequently used acronyms
are presented in Table I.
Fig. 2 illustrates the high level architecture of 5G networks.
The network softwarization enabled the ability to represent the
5G network as a layered model similar to SDN networks. Here,
5G will support a wide range of devices, including mobile
phones and different IoT devices [10], [11]. IoT devices grow
from simple household appliances to sensors and other high
advanced technologies. Also, 5G will support different RAT
(Radio Access Technologies) to connect these devices. In
addition to the pre-4G radio, 5G will introduce a set of new
radio technologies such as NOMA (Non-Orthogonal Multiple
Access), massive MIMO, mmWave (millimeter Wave) and
several other IoT communication technologies [12].
The backhaul of 5G network can be divided in to three
different layers; Infrastructure layer, control layer and business
application layer. The infrastructure layer contains the basic
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connectivity devices such as BS (Base Stations), routers and
switches. In contrast to the pre-5G network, infrastructure
layer devices do not enable with an intelligence. All the
network control functionalities and decision making entities
are placed in the control layer. This control layer interacts with
the business layer. Also, it can translate the network service
requests from the business layer as control commands and
deliver to the infrastructure layer devices. Thus, all the network
services as well as business applications are implemented
in the business layer. In addition, The E2E (End to End)
management and orchestration layer is used in parallel to
synchronize the operation of all three layers.
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Fig. 2. The High level Architecture of 5G Network with different operational
layers.
The security associated with 5G technologies has considered
as one of the key requirements related to both 5G and beyond
systems. Moreover, the most of the security models in pre-5G
(i.e. 2G, 3G and 4G) networks can not be directly utilized in
5G due to new architecture and new services [13]. However,
some of the security mechanisms can be used with some
modification. For the backward compatibility with the previous
generation, Open Air Interface (OAI) platform [14] discussed
in the wide context of 5G and overview for the security
protocol improvement in 5G provided in [15].
In the past, the key ambition for security in the telecom-
munication network was to ensure proper functionality of the
billing system and the security of radio interface by encrypting
the communication data. In 3G, two-way authentication is
used to eliminate the connection establishment with fake BS.
Finally, 4G networks use advanced cryptographic protocols
for user authentication. It also offers the protection against
the physical attacks such as the physical tampering of base
stations, which can be installed on public and user premises.
Moreover, some of the privacy issues were solved to a certain
extent in pre-5G network since user data were stored in mobile
operator own databases. However, 5G security and privacy
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Fig. 3. The Overall View of 5G Security Impact for Heterogeneity of
Connected Devices and More Users.
issues are overpowering these mechanisms due to the change
of architecture and new services.
The security of 5G and beyond 5G networks has three main
components. First, almost all the above security threats and
security requirements related to pre-5G mobile generations are
still applicable in 5G and beyond. Second, 5G will have a
new set of security challenges due to the increased number
of users, heterogeneity of connected devices, new network
services, high user privacy concerns, new stakeholders and
requirements to support IoT and mission-critical applications
(Fig. 3). Third, network softwarization and utilization of new
technologies such as SDN, NFV, MEC and NS will introduce
a brand new set of security and privacy challenges. Fig. 4
illustrates the overall view of 5G Security requirements which
has built based on these three components.
A. Motivation of the Paper and Comparison with Other Sur-
veys
In this survey, we aim to provide an overview of the
cutting-edge technologies (e.g., SDN, NFV, MEC, etc.) that
are the main building blocks of 5G network. Another aim
is to understand the security and privacy advances from the
viewpoint of SDN, NFV, MEC, etc. To this aim, we mainly
focus on the contributions from both academia and industry
that are addressing security and privacy of 5G networks.
As highlighted in Fig. 4, this survey has also focused on
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Fig. 4. Formation of 5G and Beyond Security Requirements
opportunities and challenges in terms of security which are
related to key technologies in 5G.
As the next generation of mobile networks, 5G is one of
the highly active research domains among telecommunication
researchers. As a result several surveys were already pub-
lished on 5G networks [1], [16]–[20]. Many future research
possibilities such as architecture, mobility management, traffic
management, security, privacy and techno-economic aspects,
discussed in these papers which are highly important to be
considered during the deployments of 5G networks. Among
these requirements, the security of 5G core technologies
network is an indefeasible factor. Security has highlighted
as one of the utmost important requirements in 5G research
domain. However, a quite limited number of survey papers
were published in the 5G security domain [21]–[26]. None
of the above surveys has considered all the aspects of the
5G security. A survey of existing authentication and privacy-
preserving schemes from 4G to 5G are presented in [23].
However, the impact on 5G due to network softwarization
techniques is still missing here. A survey on green communi-
cation and security challenges in 5G wireless communication
networks was presented in [26]. A survey on security for 5G
communications and SDMNs was presented in [24], [27], [28].
Since above papers were published in few years back most
of the recent research works are not included. Moreover, 5G
network softwarization techniques other than SDN and NFV
were not considered.
On the other hand, 5G has developed on various novel
network softwarization technologies such as SDN, NFV, MEC,
cloud computing and NS. It is significant to consider the
security of underline 5G technologies with analyses of the
security in 5G networks. Table II summarizes the recently
published surveys related to security of 5G and above 5G
technologies. Most of these articles are focused on either
individual technologies such as SDN, NFV, MEC and NS
security. However, these studies are quite shallow in addressing
security issues while integrating them in 5G networks.
Furthermore, in our previous research articles [21], [22], we
briefly discuss the important of 5G security and the security
challenges in underline technologies such as SDN, NFV and
MEC. However, these papers do not contain a comprehensive
analysis all the security aspects such as threat vectors, the
security of network slicing and IoT as well as related projects.
Thus, this survey offers a offer a comprehensive overview
of the state-of-the-art security technologies and mechanisms
which are required for the complementary security framework
for 5G by extending the previous works.
B. Our Contributions
To the best of our knowledge there is not a single survey
which addresses a broader range of 5G security by considering
all of the key 5G technologies. Thus, this is the first work
that considered security and privacy issues in the key network
softwarization technologies used in 5G networks. Since all
these network softwarization techniques are very essential to
the realization of 5G, it is important to highlight their inter
connection in terms of security and privacy. The main goal
of this work is to broaden the horizons of potential inter-
dependencies related to network security in different network
softwarization technologies in the future 5G networks.
The contributions of our paper are listed below:
• Study of security landscapes in 5G Networks: A com-
prehensive search conducted on 5G security model, next
generation threat landscape for 5G, IoT threat landscapes
and threat analysis in 5G networks. In addition, the paper
discusses the security recommendations, i.e., ITU-T and
NGMN.
• Identify the key areas of 5G security, from the state-of-
the-art literature: The paper discusses in detail various
security challenges related to key areas of 5G security.
• Highlight the security challenges related to key tech-
nologies in 5G Identify and discuss the open challenges
and opportunities in security and privacy related to the
key 5G technologies, i.e. SDN, NFV, MEC, cloud com-
puting and network slicing.
• PLS (Physical Layer Security) in 5G: The PLS section
contains a discussion on the current hot research areas
in 5G physical layer communication network. For each
research area we presented our contribution in both
tabular and graphical forms.
• Investigate security monitoring and management in
5G network: The future networks will connect a huge
number of devices, which will exponentially increase the
security issues in monitoring and management of 5G
networks. Therefore, we examine the security issues and
countermeasures in 5G network monitoring and manage-
ment.
• Comprehensive view of privacy in 5G networks: The
paper categorizes the privacy from the viewpoint of users
and identify privacy challenges for the 5G networks.
Furthermore, the paper pointed out a few regulatory
objectives in privacy protections and privacy mechanisms
in the 5G networks.
• Discuss activities in standardization bodies: The role
of different standardization bodies is utmost important to
JOURNAL OF LATEX IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS, JULY 2019 5
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT SURVEYS RELATED TO 5G SECURITY
Aspect Ref. Main contribution Relevance to 5G Security
5G General [1] A comprehensive overview on the new architectural
changes proposed for Radio Access Network (RAN) de-
sign for 5G.
No explicit focus on security aspects.
[18] A review on the vision of the 5G networks by discussing
architectural options, application implementation issues as
well as real demonstrations and testbeds.
Describes the Security and privacy issues and man-
agement related to UEs (User Equipment), access
networks, D2D communication and C-RAN.
[19] A comprehensive survey of on different 5G backhaul
network technologies and solutions.
No explicit focus on security aspects.
[20] A survey of latest research and development effort related
to 5G.
No explicit focus on security aspects.
5G Security [21],
[22]
Highlight the security and privacy threats in 5G networks
and the possible security solutions for these threats.
Discuss the security challenges related to SDN, NFV,
mobile clouds technologies and possible 5G privacy
issues.
[23] A survey of existing authentication and privacy-preserving
schemes for 4G and 5G mobile networks.
Presents a classification of threat models in 4G and
5G cellular networks in four types of attacks, i.e.
attacks against privacy, integrity, availability, and au-
thentication. Also provides a classification of three
countermeasures, i.e. cryptography methods, humans
factors, and intrusion detection methods.
[26] A survey on green communication and security challenges
in 5G networks.
Possible security attacks on users within the Small Cell
Access point (SCA) of the 5G networks have studied.
[29] A A survey on the Security and the evolution of Osmotic
and Catalytic Computing for 5G Networks.
Highlight the use of recent computing paradigms as
alternative mechanisms for the enhancement of 5G
security.
General Mobile
network Security
[30] A survey on existing literature on attacks and defenses in
all three pre-5G network generations.
Explore relevant security and privacy threats in pre-5G
mobile networks and discuss the potential impact on
5G networks. No implicit focus on impact of new 5G
technologies.
SDMN Security [25] A survey of SDMN and its related security problems. Explore relevant security threats and their correspond-
ing countermeasures with respect to the data layer,
control layer, application layer, and communication
protocols in SDMNs.
[27] A survey on issues and challenges in designing SDN based
wireless networks.
Review various SDN based seminal security solutions
for 4G and 5G.
[28] A review on security enhancement in SDN based wireless
networks.
Discuss how SDN can used to enhance the security of
SDMNs.
SDN Security [31]–
[34]
A survey of related security issues in SDN based systems. No explicit focus on 5G and security aspects of other
5G technologies.
NFV Security [35]–
[37]
A survey of related security issues in NFV based systems. No explicit focus on 5G and security aspects of other
5G technologies.
IoT Security [38]–
[45]
A survey of related security issues in IoT. No explicit focus on 5G and security aspects of 5G
technologies.
[46],
[47]
A survey of using novel technologies such as machine
learning and blockchain to enhance the security in IoT.
No explicit focus on 5G and security aspects of 5G
technologies.
[48] Discussion with respect to Perception, Network, Middle
and Application layers
Threats and solutions for upcoming 5G challenges.
[49] A survey for all IoT layers, specific discussion on appli-
cations, network architecture and industrial trends.
Analyze security, privacy and proposed a security
model for risk minimization.
Access control
and Privacy
[50] A survey for a host centric network with Physical, Net-
work and Application layers.
Focus on existing access control, security and privacy
mechanism.
SDN security [51] Discuss SDN security and data plane programmability
security implications for SDN to stateful SDN.
Enlightened vulnerabilities with their reduced expo-
sure and stateful SDN Data planes security.
Physical Layer
Security (PLS)
[52] AN injection, anti-eavesdropping signal design, prevented
beamforming/precoding, secure cooperative transmission,
resource allocation and controlled power approach has
been reviewed.
Emphasis that cryptography is not applicable for 5G.
[53] Discussion on three different approaches: Spatial model-
ing, mobile association and device connection for HetNet.
No explicit focus on 5G and security aspects of 5G
technologies.
[54] Discussion the importance of PLS for secure transmission
of information in 5G
A short survey focusing only on PLS.
D2D
communication
[55] A survey that emphasised that Application layer is mostly
based on cryptography. The approach of D2D taxonomy
and better layer combination security protocol has been
used.
PLS can be tackled without cryptography.
Control plane
ASON
[56] A survey of related security issues in the structure, func-
tions, protocols, security analysis and probable attacks in
5G technology.
Concludes that ASON is a potential solution for in-
creasing network growth.
define the security of 5G network. The paper contains
a discussion on the security standards from different
standardization bodies and a brief overview of the roles
of different 5G standardization security forces.
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• Present holistic overview on ongoing research projects
in 5G security. The paper discusses various intentionally
signified ongoing research projects globally, those are
addressing and contributing efforts to 5G security.
• Future research directions: Based on our finding, we
have highlighted the possible and important research
challenges that have to be addressed, along with their
early solutions and future directions. This helps future
researchers to find their future directions.
C. Outline of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the mobile network threat landscape. It includes the
discussion about security evolution from 1G to 4G, 5G evolved
security model, 5G threat landscape, IoT threat landscape,
5G threat analysis and the 5G security recommendations
by different telecommunication standard organizations. Sec-
tion III is particularly focuses on the key areas of 5G security.
It presents security issues related to authentication, access
control, communication security and encryption. Each key area
is described with its security requirements for 5G and related
works. Section IV is particularly focuses on security issues
related to the key 5G technologies, i.e. SDN/SDMN, NFV,
MEC, cloud computing and network slicing. Security issues
associated with with each of these technologies are extensively
discussed. Moreover, the relevance to the 5G security is also
presented with related works. Section V presents a current
hot research areas in 5G physical layer security. The main
focus of this section is to discuss security in the OFDMA
(Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access), NOMA,
UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), mmWave, massive MIMO,
channel coding, RF (Radio Frequency) energy harvesting
and other physical layer issues related to 5G. Section VI
discusses the security monitoring and management aspects of
5G networks. It presents the existing challenges in 5G security
monitoring and management as well as the related work on
the domain. Section VII contains a complete discussion of 5G
privacy. Section VIII discusses the network security related
activities in various standardization bodies in 5G eco-system.
Section IX summarizes the proceeding research projects in
the 5G security domain. Based on our findings, Section X
describes the lessons learned and future research directions.
Finally, Section XI concludes the paper. The outline of the
paper has illustrated in the Fig. 5.
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Fig. 6. Evolution of Mobile Network Security Landscape with offered technologies and respective security threats.
II. MOBILE NETWORKS SECURITY LANDSCAPE
This section provides the basic landscape for the overall 5G
security communication system. The entire evolved security
model is discussed with general threat landscape, IoT threat
landscape, 5G security threat analysis, and security recom-
mendation by ITU-T, and NGMN are also presented in this
section.
A. Evolution of Mobile Network Security and Threat Land-
scape
The telecommunication networks have evolved through four
generations and we are at the edge of experiencing the latest
5G mobile networks. Along with each mobile generation, the
security landscape of mobile networks has also evolved. The
evolution of mobile network security landscape is presented
in the Fig. 6.
In the early 1970s, the telephone networks were vulner-
able only for the phreaking or hacking threats [57], [58].
In the modern era, technology has taken a twist drastically.
Telecommunication has shown up a radical change to an
info-communication system. Evolution of technology occurred
parallel to the increment of security threats. It has been
progressed from a war dialer to worms, viruses and modern-
day APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) [3]. Challengingly,
protection tools have also evolved in the form of anti-virus,
physical access control, context-aware firewalls, and modern
application as discussed in [3].
1) 1G Security and Threat Landscape: The very first mo-
bile network or 1G mobile network were introduced in 1980s
[59]. It was based on analog technologies. 1G mobile phones
were able to support only voice call services within a single
country. 1G mobile networks were also known Advanced
Mobile Phone System (AMPS) in United States (US) and the
Nordic Mobile Telephony (NMT) in Europe. Data services and
roaming were not a part of 1G mobile network service list.
However, mobile security threats begin with the introduction
of 1G mobile communication. With the passage of time, tech-
nology grew dynamically and provided a challenging threat
landscape. The hacking was easier in 1G mobile network since
it’s radio link had no support for encryption due to their analog
nature. Therefore, the 1G calls can be easily intercepted. If the
attacker wants to intercept a call, he just has to use a radio
scanner and tune it to the correct frequency. By intercepting
these calls, the attacker can obtain the user credentials such as
the Mobile Identification Number (MIN) and Electronic Serial
Number (ESN). Later, these credentials can be used to clone
another phone to impersonate the subscriber.
Later, evolved 1G networks supported optional analog
scrambling to prevent attackers listening to the channel. Al-
though, these scrambling methods were able to prevent such
scanning issues, it was not strong as encrypted methods used
in later mobile generations.
2) 2G Security and Threat Landscape: After 1G mobile
communication, 2G mobile networks were introduced in 1991.
2G provided voice plus messaging facility for the mobile
users. It was the first mobile generations to introduce data
services, i.e.SMS (Short Message Service). Moreover, 2G
networks were operated in digital domain [60]. 2G network
introduces several security features such as authentication of
subscribers using shared-secret cryptography, the encryption
of radio interface traffic and protecting the confidentiality of
the subscriber’s identity. 2G networks used SIM (Subscriber
Identity Module) card; which a hardware security module
which stores a cryptovariable. This has to use in each mobile
phone and it verifies the identity of the mobile subscriber.
2G was also suffered by a unique set of security challenges.
In 2G networks, attackers were using spamming as pervasive
attacks for transmitting unwanted information to the users. It
resulted in a number of spam messages in users’ mobile. At-
tackers used spam messages for vicious purposes. Interruption
of mobile communication with fake authentication of rogue
JOURNAL OF LATEX IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS, JULY 2019 8
BSs was one of the introduced hacking process [61], [62].
Moreover, both stream ciphers, i.e. A5/1 and A5/2 used in
2G networks to encrypt the calls can break realtime by using a
ciphertext-only attack [62]. SMS also had security vulnerabili-
ties due to its store-and-forward nature. Especially, the content
of roaming SMS messages were exposed to external attackers
who reside within the Internet [63].
3) 3G Security and Threat Landscape: Mobile phones
were fulfilling basic ICT requirements of human life. Such
observation motivated mobile researchers to introduce data
applications and Internet in 3G mobile communication tech-
nology. NTT DoCoMo launched the first commercial 3G
network on 2001, using the Wideband Code Division Multiple
Access WCDMA technology by enabling mobile Internet
access. Initially, bandwidth of 3G network is 128 Kbps for
mobile stations, and 2 Mbps for fixed applications [64]. Later
3G network versions were able to support high data rates and
new services such as video call, MMS (Multimedia Message
Services), mobile television and mobile internet.
Lessons learned from 2G security issues were helped to
design better security mechanisms in 3G networks. The key
security issues in 2G networks such as false BS attack and
shorter key lengths, were corrected in 3G. Moreover, 3G
security features and mechanisms were designed in a way that
they can be can be extended and enhanced to mitigate new
threats and satisfy the security requirements on new services
[62].
Furthermore, 3G security architecture consisted of five
different sets of features, i.e 1) network access security, 2)
network domain security, 3) user domain security, 4) applica-
tion security and 5) visibility and configurability of security
[62].
3G mobile communication system cellular phones also
faced a lot of security threats which targeted the operating
system, user phones, and the computer system. Vulnerability of
the mobiles caused malicious code gain to unauthorized access
which includes users’ sensitive information. 3G networks were
also vulnerable to attacks such as eavesdropping, imperson-
ation of a subscriber, user impersonation with compromised
authentication vector, impersonation of the network, man-in-
the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks by de-registration
spoofing, location update spoofing and camping on a false BS.
4) 4G Security and Threat Landscape: It was the first time
for 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) that all mobile devices
switched to E2E (End to End) architecture based on all-IP.
4G was deployed in 2010 and early 4G networks supports
speed up to 100 Mbps. Use of a higher Layer Protocol (IP)
as transport medium affords intelligence at every stage within
the network relative to a service.
The security architecture of 4G builds upon the lessons
learned from deploying the 2G and 3G networks. 4G intro-
duced a new set of cryptographic algorithms and a significantly
different key structure than 2G and 3G. New cryptographic
algorithms such as EPS Encryption Algorithms (EEA) and
EPS Integrity Algorithms (EIA) were used 4G [62]. Moreover,
most of the keys in 4G are 256-bits long in contrast to the 128
bit keys in 3G. Moreover, 4G uses different algorithms and key
sizes for the control and user planes traffic. The primary 4G
authentication mechanism is known as the Authentication and.
Key Agreement (AKA) protocol and use of AKA required by
3GPP TS 33.401 [65]. Here, integrity and replay protection
for 4G air interface traffic are provided by NAS (Non-Access
Stratum) and RRC (Radio Resource Control)-signaling proto-
col. After that, the 4G backhaul traffic should be encrypted by
using IPsec protocols [66].
The open all-IP based 4G architecture becomes vulnerable
to various security attacks. Due the coherent IP connectivity
of 4G core network with the Internet, 4G networks becomes
vulnerable to millions of attackers and new security threats
from the Internet [62] [67]. 4G networks are now vulnerable
a large set of IP based attacks such as IP address spoofing,
TCP SYN DoS, User ID theft, Theft of Service (ToS), DoS
(Denial of Service), and intrusion attacks [67]. Moreover, pre-
4G networks had some level natural protection due to the
use of none IP protocols in the core network [68]. It makes
the job of attackers very difficult. Understanding the complex
mobile protocols was difficult for the attackers. The IP core
has relaxed this hurdle in 4G [23] [69].
In addition, new high power 4G mobile devices are perfects
sources to perform DoS, Botnet, APT, viruses and worms.
Moreover, 4G networks support multiple non-3GPP networks
such as Wi-Fi and WIMAX [67]. Thus, 4G will inherit all
the security problems of these networks as well. Comparably,
non-3GPP networks such as Wi-Fi and WIMAX have lower
levels of security than a mobile network [23], [68]
With the new 4G technology mobile operators were capable
of providing new offers including high speed of the services.
However, it also increased the impact of security challenges.
APT and DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) are greatly af-
fecting the system security and leaded to high financial losses.
Attackers become organized and wiser than expectation. Some
of these attacks became harder to detect the presence of an
attack in IP based 4G mobile network [23], [68].
5) 5G Threat Landscape: 5G is offering a mind-blowing
improvement in the network services. It will allow billions of
devices to operate with better reliability, facilities, speed, sys-
tem capacity, bandwidth utilization, fault tolerance and latency
than 4G devices. 5G era will provide an ideal target for at-
tackers due to IoT, connected world and critical infrastructure
facilities as shown in Fig. 3 and 7. High probability of attacks
is especially toward political and financial motivated gains
by criminals and professionals with extensive resources and
knowledge of technology. 5G threat landscape dynamically
based on complex and sophisticated threats like flame and
stuxnet malwares. A brief overview on 5G evolved threats can
be observed from Fig. 7. The rest of the sections are presented
with the detailed descriptions of threat landscape of 5G.
B. 5G Evolved Security Model
Wireless communication systems are not only limited to typ-
ical phone audio and video calls. They also support a number
of applications including gaming, shopping, social networking,
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), home appliances, and cloud
technologies which have opened up wide range of research
challenge to developers [20] [70].
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Fig. 7. 5G Security Threat Landscape for several attacks in IoT, smart phones, cloud RAN and connected world.
Fig. 8. 5G Evolved Security Model for upcoming technology’s threat
awareness.
Similarly, phreaking is not limited to stealing general infor-
mation [58]. It has now converted into big cyber-crime rings
with clear financial, political and personal motives [71]. The
IoT world has now brought another big challenge where the
connection between the devices is opening a number of vul-
nerabilities within the 5G network [41]. Therefore, provision
of adequate security level is mandatory for the ever-evolving
security threat landscape of 5G communication. Following
[57], [72], the authors have integrated visibility and centralized
policy as two new security parameters in the conventional
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) for enhancing
security and protection of users’ data as shown in Fig. 8.
1) Confidentiality: In the 5G security model, data con-
fidentiality is one of the main security requirements; the
property that can protect data transmission from disclosure
to unauthorized entities and from passive attacks (i.e., eaves-
dropping). Considering the 4G-LTE and 5G architectures,
any user plane data must be confidential and protected from
unauthorized users [73]. Standard data encryption algorithms
have been widely adopted to realize the data confidentiality
in 5G network applications (e.g., vehicle network [74], health
monitoring [75] etc). The symmetric key encryption algorithm
can be utilized to encrypt and decrypt 5G data with one private
key. This is shared between the communicating entities (e.g.,
a sender and a receiver).
2) Integrity: This is to prevent tempering and loss of
information during transformation from one point to another.
Integrity of 5G New Radio (NR) traffic is protected similar to
4G. In 5G NR, the integrity protected of wireless data traffic
at the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer. In
4G LTE integrity protection is provided only for Non-Access
Stratum (NAS) and Access Stratum (AS) [82]. However, One
main of key advancement in 5G integrity protection entails
that 5G NR offers the integrity protection of the user plane
as well. This is significant because 4G did not support the
integrity protection of the user plane. This new feature is useful
for small data transmissions, particularly for constrained IoT
devices. Moreover, 5G authentication mechanism 5G-AKA
is using integrity-protected signaling. This ensures that no
unauthorized party can modify or access the information that
is communicated over the air [83].
3) Availability: In 5G domain, networks availability is to
ensure that the network resources can be accessible when-
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TABLE III
IOT SECURITY CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS.
Ref Technology Challenge/Threat Solutions Layers Protocols
[76]
IoT Smart water system •Cyber-attacks.
•Epidemic attack.
•Faults and destructive attack.
• Security and Privatized Se-
curity.
•ABA-IDS algorithm •Applications.
•Perception/end devices.
•Services.
•Communications.
•Wi-Fi.
•ETHE(Ethernet).
[77]
IoT security component •Authentication.
•Authorization.
•OAuth 2.0-based
oneM2M component
• Perceptions. •CoAP.
•MQTT.
[78]
General IoT •Eavesdropper collusion. •PLS. •Communications. •blacktooth.
•ZigBee.
•IEEE. 802.15.4
[79]
IoT environment •Dolev-Yao threat. •Signature-based AKA
scheme.
•Communication. • HLPSL
[80]
SDN based IoT-Fog •MitM •Blood filter method •Perception •OpenFlow
[81]
Industrial Mobile-IoT •Malware. •Dynamic, static, and hy-
brid analysis.
•Android applications.
ever they are needed by legitimate users, since the avail-
ability effects on the reputation of service provider. In an-
other words, the availability ensures the high probability
effectiveness of network infrastructure. It also measures the
sustainability of a network against active attacks, e.g., DoS
attack. A DoS attack can degrade the network performance.
However, in [84], the authors suggested that via the ex-
treme Mobile Broadband (eMBB) and ultra-reliable Machine-
Type-Communication (uMTC) the network availability can be
achieved by at least 95% and 99.99%, respectively, for the 5G
applications.
4) Centralized security policy: In 5G network, the current
3GPP 4G security architectures cannot directly applied to the
new 5G use-cases as they are dedicated to the traditional
operators-subscriber trust model. Therefore, to support new
innovations (such as NFV and SDN), there is the need for a
centralized security policies management system that provides
convenience for users to access the applications and resources.
In [85], Thanh et al. proposed a policy-based security man-
agement framework (VISECO) to support centralized security
management for 5G. The authors claimed that with the help
of VISECO, mobile operators can secure their network in-
frastructure. In addition, the operators can enable Security-as-
a-Service (SaaS) as a potential solution to several customers
such as IoT vendors.
5) Visibility: Visibility enables E2E-awareness of mobile
networks to the control plane. This can efficiently tackle the
basic network issues to ensure a secure environment. The 5G
networks need to utilize comprehensive end-to-end security
strategies, which should cover all layers of the network includ-
ing application, signaling and data planes. To implement such
comprehensive security mechanism, 5G operators should have
a complete visibility, inspection and controls over all layers in
the network. Here, the 5G technologies should be integrated
with open APIs to manage with the security policies. In such
a way, 5G network can have consistent security polices of
both software and hardware in the network. The enhanced
visibility across the network and security policies will help to
implement contextual security mechanisms which is suitable
for new 5G services. Moreover, enhance visibility enables
data-driven threat prevention to find and isolate the infected
devices before attacks can potentially take place.
C. Threat Landscape of Internet of Things (IoT)
Recently, IoT has drawn a great attention due to the at-
tractive and unique features. The idea is to provide a smart
world built on the combination of millions of smart computing
devices. Several offered smart applications services including
Social IoT (SIoT), Industrial IoT (IIoT), IoT-fog, IoT smart
water system, health care IoT and smart grids [86], [87]. With
the drastic increase in the web of the technology, the risk of
security threats and challenges are also increasing rapidly. Not
only the technology but also threats are getting smarter. This
problem immediately needs to be resolved. Table III shows
some of the detected threats with their proposed solutions.
Moreover, Fig. 9 illustrates the threat landscape on different
IoT applications.
Several researchers have provided solutions to the detected
threats in different domains of IoT. Due to high density and
low latency requirements, the solutions of security issues
for IoT networks are challenging. However, the authors of
[81] analyzed the security threats and detection schemes
of the industrial IoT networks statistically, dynamically and
with hybrid detection. This analysis is particularly helpful
for the application designers. In [88], the authors analyzed
threats for PLS and industrial IoT environment. Suggestion
for abundant PHY-Sec (Physical Layer security) technologies
in [89] provides assistance for enhanced industrial wireless
system security.
By introducing a viable attack model in an IoT-Fog ar-
chitecture, the authors of [80] have investigated the possible
threats of MitM attacks on the Open-Flow control channel
in the SDN based IoT-fog systems. In [90], authors have
studied SIoT security landscape by providing a taxonomic
analysis from transportation, perception and application level
perspective. In IoT smart water system, the authors of [76]
have proposed a procedure to develop a threat model ABA-IDS
(Abnormal Behavior Analysis-Intrusion Detection System) for
identifying attacks against four layers including; services,
devices, communication and application layers. As a part of
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Fig. 9. Threat landscape on different IoT categories and their applications.
the communication layer, the authors have presented the way
to use the proposed model for protecting the secure gateway.
This model is capable of detecting known and unknown attacks
with a high detection rate.
For the prediction of ventricular arrhythmia, the authors
of [91] have developed a secure and ultra-low power IoT
sensing platform. The authors development uses signals of
ECG to get a chip-specific ECG key for enabling the protection
of the communication channel. The proposed scheme when
implemented with an existing design provides hardware level
protection as well.
Keeping the importance of authentication in mind, the
authors of [79] have proposed an authenticated key estab-
lishment scheme based on signatures for IoT. The proposed
scheme is comparable to some of other techniques and verified
for security by resorting to Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic,
formal and informal security analysis via automated validation
of application tools and internet security protocol. To scale
proportionately solutions for the issues of confidentiality, trust
and privacy in distributed networks, the authors [92] provided
a novel configurable policy-based specification and analyzed
vulnerabilities and threats of IoT system.
A few authors have provided the security threats solutions in
terms of hardware components of the IoT system environment.
For addressing the security challenges at the perception layer,
the authors of [93] targeted the common security issues of IoT
and system hardware. Authors have given some of the security
features to incorporate in the System on Chip (SoC)/micro-
controllers for achieving the target. In [77], authors claims to
fulfill the requirement of the required security component in
IoT by proposing OAuth 2.0-based oneM2M for providing
authentication and authorization. In [94], the authors have
proposed a reconfigurable cryptographic processor called Re-
cryptor. It uses near-memory and in-memory computing for
supporting cryptographic large vector calculations efficiently.
Various secret/public key cryptographies and hash functions
for the implementation of cryptographic primitives have been
utilized.
According to [95], along with the set of opportunities, IoT
integration with integrated 5G depends highly on large-scale
deployed sensors, which increase the security risk drastically.
For better data streaming, private Unscented Kalman filter
(UKF) has proposed for both linear and non-linear systems,
which ensures the privacy of user’s data collected by the
cloud. For the evaluation of private streaming data based on
Unscented Kalman Filter (UKFDP), four real world data set
and average relative error has taken. The authors of [78], used
PLS and analytical approaches including classical probability
theory, Laplace transform, and Cauchy integral Theorem for
analyzing secrecy outage probability of an IoT system.
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D. Security Recommendations by ITU-T
This subsection discusses the security properties, which
are basically recommended by the ITU-T. These security
properties can address several aspects of the ICT systems, ap-
plications, services and information in 5G domain, as follows.
• Access Control: Access control mechanisms prevent the
malicious use of a resource, including the prevention of
use of a resource in an illegal manner. Typically, these
mechanisms (e.g., role-based access control) ensure that
only legitimate users, devices or machines are granted
permissions (e.g., read, write, etc.) the resources in a
network, database, information flows, services and ap-
plications.
• Data confidentiality: In a 5G network, many devices
collect and forward sensitive data to many stakeholders.
Therefore, data confidentiality protects data from unau-
thorized disclosure and ensures that the authorized users
can read the data content.
• Data integrity: Integrity property ensures the data is not
modified in the transit or data is intact from its source to
the destination.
• Authentication: Entity authentication is a mechanism that
is used for one entity to prove its identity to a correspond-
ing entity. An authentication mechanism can protect from
impersonation threats.
• Network availability: It ensures that network is always
available in normal and even in disaster recovery op-
erations. Events impacting the network, such as device
failures, natural disasters and security compromise, the
network must available to the users and devices.
• Non-repudiation: This property is used to demonstrate
that the origin of the received data or messages is a par-
ticular peer. This peer cannot falsely deny the authenticity
of the data or message as the message is signed by the
peer’s private key.
E. Security Threats and Recommendations by NGMN
Technological improvements are bringing dynamic changes
to the system architecture and network requirements. Due to
a number of connected devices in 5G communications, there
is a high probability of new security threats. According to
the demands and requirements of system security NGMN has
provided some of the probable threats with recommendations
for their solutions [96]–[99]. Table IV lists out the possible
security threats and their recommendations by NGMN.
For the most of the security threats, NGMN has either
recommended the explosion of new mechanism or authenti-
cation for network slicing, access network, MEC, latency and
consistent user experience.
III. KEY AREAS OF 5G SECURITY
This section presents the most challenging security issues
related to the key security areas in 5G, i.e, access control,
authentication, communication and encryption.
A. Authentication
Authentication plays a significant security role in any com-
munication system to verifying the identity of users. Numerous
techniques had used for authentication in each generation of
mobile communication. However, this section is enlightening
the authentication technique particularly developed for 5G
communication system by 3GPP. Preliminary there is a basic
division of authentication; primary and secondary authentica-
tion. The 3GPP completed the normative specifications of 5G
Phase 1 in 3GPP Release 15. Fig. 10 demands the authentica-
tion in 5G Phase 1 security. Primary authentication provides
Data Network 
(DN)
Home Public 
Land Mobile 
Network
(HPLMN)
Primary 
Authentication
Secondary 
Authentication
User 
Equipment 
(UE)
Visited Public 
Land Mobile 
Network
(VPLMN)
Fig. 10. Authentication in 5G Phase 1 security enhancement.
device and network mutual authentication in both 4G and 5G.
However, due to evolved 5G nature, primary authentication
has also evolved minor differences. Built-in home control
authentication mechanism controls the knowledge and call of
device authentication. 5G-AKA and Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)-AKA are two mandatory authentication selec-
tions for 5G phase 1. Specific cases such as private networks
are optionally allowing EAP based authentication. Primary
authentication can run over non-3GPP technologies as well
since it is independent of the RA (Radio Access) technology.
The authentication of data networks outside a mobile operators
domain is secondary authentication. EAP based associated
credentials and authentication methods are applicable to this
method.
Mutual authentication and the provision of keying material
between the UE and the network are achievable with key man-
agement and primary authentication procedures. The primary
key and authentication management procedures provide an
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TABLE IV
SECURITY THREATS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY NGMN [96]–[99]
Domain Threats Recommendations
Network
Slicing
Communication between inter-network slices is not secure. Controlled and secure communication between all slices, function and
interfaces between them.
Impersonation attack against physical host platform and
network slice manager.
Mutual authentication between host platform and network slice manager.
Within an operator network impersonation attack against a
Network Slice instance.
Authenticity and integrity of Network Slice instance need to be verified.
Within an operator network impersonation attack against
multiple Network Slice Managers.
Mutual authentication between all Network Slice Managers.
Variance of policies and protocols for different slices. Proper isolation between slices and separate authentication of each slice
for a UE or authentication at a lower security slice.
Denial of service attack to other slices. Capping for slices individually for provisioning maximum resources.
Affect of other slices’ resources exhaustion. Ring-fencing provide flexibility to run in all conditions.
Side channel attacks due to same set of primary hardware. Avoid co-hosting with different level of sensitivity and strong isolation
of virtual machines.
Combination of vitualized and regular function in a hybrid
deployment model offers new threats.
Maintenance of same 5G security level.
Service for UE with multiple slices at the same time
provides risk of security.
Sealing between slices with a security mechanism in both UE and
network.
Access
Network
Expected high traffic either malicious or accidental. Reduce traffic changers whenever possible and be flexible for maintaining
system performance.
Risk of key leakage between operator’s links. Strong security link between operators or a new method for key sharing.
Optional security implementation offers security threat. Study for mandating security.
Subscriber device level security in 5G due to roaming routed
IP traffic in 5G.
Virtualization and network slicing.
DoS Attack Exhaustion of signaling plane with a number of devices that
gain access simultaneously.
Stop new unknown access through access control when network is
exhausted or check the novelty and standardization of signal patter and
requires to find a new method to overcome DOS attack.
Exhaustion of signaling plane with a number of simultane-
ously and intermittently data transfer devices.
Avoid time synchronized data transfer, Use of analytical techniques
for consistent and persistent communication devices, access control and
designing of new techniques.
Stopping services for a number of devices due to traffic
overload is sometimes a trick by an attacker.
Series of overload defenses, defense overload mechanism and designing
of new mechanism that limits services for the problematic devices.
Bulk configuration leading to bulk provisioning. Analytical techniques like anomaly detection.
MEC MEC deployment billing risk. Periodic polling from UE to core network to cross check received
charging records from edge. A new or similar mechanism like that of
3GPP.
MEC applications run on the same platform of network
function.
A new framework for either providing access to only trusted MEC
devices or making MEC and network operator independent of trust.
Influence on network by an allowed third party. Network operators must limit network distortion to a certain level.
Providing security service to a third party. Expose security services to trusted applications only.
MEC environment user plane attacks. It is required to carefully study the scenario specially in case of a number
of caches and new architecture.
Sensitive security assets on Edge. Proper encryption, assurance of security, protection of decryption keys.
Exchange of data between Edge and Core. Encryption of the sensitive asset.
Trust establishment between the edge and the core func-
tions.
Authentication between communication resources.
MEC Orchestrator communication security. Guarantee of the security level as per recognized scheme.
Multiple new nodes, RD and many LI points will raise
security risk.
Follow strong physical security and identified method of implementation
and location for LI/RD functionality.
Latency Security mechanism for latency targets. Changes in 3GPP architecture, moving encryption operation to lower
layer, dropped user plane security, use a fast stream cipher.
Subscriber authentication within visited network. Re-use of old SA (Security Association) for low latency at user plane
and high latency at signalling plane and Delegating DSS (Distributed
Subscriber Server) from HSS (Home Subscriber Server) to visited
network by a key ”Ki” for subscribers’ authentication.
Re-authentication request for the loss of service on a user
plane.
No critical path on user plane and no strict bound between user plane
and control plane.
Consistent User
Experience
Credentials to IMS (Internet protocol Multimedia Subsys-
tem) and 3GPP network access.
Prevent credentials at required level of security.
Access for non-3GPP network. Authentication, key agreement, if untrusted access then set up authenti-
cation process between UE and the core.
Weak security for less trusted 3GPP network access. Security must be provide by home network between UE and core
network.
Secure interfaces between UE and non-3GPP radio access
points.
UEs and 3GPP servers must have the capability to derive the credential
and to mannage these credentials.
anchor key known as KSEAF. Authentication Server Function
(AUSF) of home network provides KSEAF for the SEAF
of the network server. According to 3GPP and ETSI, the
Network Function (NF) and AUSF provides authentication of
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UE for NF petitioner in 5G core network. It allows Access
and Mobility Management Function (AMF) to the NF service
consumer for authenticating UE. NF provides UEs identity and
serving network name to AUSF to perform the authentication.
Now AUSF uses the information provided by AMF for 5G-
AKA or EAP-based authentication. Fig. 11 and 12 show
the authentication mechanism for 5G-AKA and EAP-based
authentication with EAP-AKA method.
Recently different authors investigated 5G security threat
mechanism for different threats and scenarios. In [100], au-
thors perform a formal analysis of 5G AKA protocol, pro-
vided precise requirements from the 3GPP 5G standards and
highlighted the missing security goals. For the authentication
of BS, in [101] an algorithm fulfills the requirement in exist-
ing 5G authentication protocol. The work of [102] provided
analysis over 5G-AKA. It revealed the dependency of 5G-
AKA on the underlying channels. A revival of attack against
5G AKA protocol, exploits the vulnerability of devices in
[103]. Authors of [104], have presented a review on 4G and
5G AKA vulnerabilities with realization of Authentication
Authorization and Accounting (AAA) weaknesses. In [105]
authors have shown the compatibility of existing Universal
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) with perfect secrecy 5G
AKA protocol. According to the heterogeneous 5G network
requirement, authors of [106] have proposed an advanced
group based AKA threat model. Authors of [107] showed that
except IMSI-catcher attack, all identified attacks against 5G-
AKA are still applicable and provided a modified version of
5G-AKA for respective prevention.
Braeken et al. proposed a novel 5G authentication and
key agreement protocol in [108]. The authors utilized ran-
dom numbers, which reduced the communication costs and
provided robust security. The proposed scheme exploited the
asymmetric key encryption to encyrpt the SUPI and generates
a message SUCI. Note that here SUCI is a log-in request. Then
the log-in request is verified by the home network. Moreover,
the authors claimed that the usage of random numbers for
5G AKA protocol is possible since the current Universal
Subscriber Identity Modules (USIMs) are now capable of
performing randomized asymmetric encryption operations. In
addition, their proposal is secure against post-compromise
security and forward security. In another work, Ozhelvaci-
Ma proposed a secure vertical handover authentication for
5G HetNets in [109]. This scheme provides a secure and
seamless handover mechanism to supply strong, quick and
mutual authentication. The authors proposed to use Extensi-
ble Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP-
TLS) that utilized a certificate-based scheme. In a similar
vein, Ma-Hu proposed a cross layer collaborative handover
authentication for 5G network [110]. The main idea of this
scheme is to use the cross-layer (i.e., physical layer) and
then utilize the EAP-AKA authentication to provide more
secure and reliable services to the user. The authors adopted
nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to perform the
physical layer authentication.
Considering the backdrop of the 5G security model, au-
thors of [111] have proposed 4G+RAM authentication model
which depends on 4G plus frequency-based re-authentication
protocol (4G+FRP) and 4G plus relative authentication model
(4G+RAM). In [112] authors proposed Privacy-Preserving
Authentication (PPAKA-HAMC) and Key Agreement protocol
(PPAKA-IBS) for an anonymous and secure D2D group
communication. In [113] authors proposed an AKA scheme
based on IoT notion for heterogeneous WSNs for mutual
authentication, anonymity and several other types of attack.
B. Access Control
The main purpose of access control is performed selective
restriction of the access to the network. Access control net-
works have controlled by the network providers to provide a
secure and safe network environment. It is the main building
block for any type of network security system. The access
control environment only confirms the authentic users’ access
to the system. Fig. 14 depicts a secured access control system
with the basic security features. Access control strategies indi-
cated at an extraordinary implementation independent level of
concept and then imposed onto the real system by influencing
accessible policy application mechanisms. In some of the latest
access control systems, the decentralization of the network
improves the secure environment of the network system. In
[120], an access selection scheme has been proposed for
D2D PLS along with multiple eavesdroppers. In the proposed
scheme, with respect to distance thresholds, D2D commu-
nication devices are sharing spectrum with cellular users.
The authors generated interference used by the authors to
misguide eavesdroppers through jamming. Optimal throughput
achievement of access selection scheme optimized the security
level from eavesdroppers. D2D protection pair is used to
protect a single user.
In [121], automated ConfigSynth framework has been pro-
posed to provide affordable and synthesizing precise network
configuration. The proposed framework is further refined to
provide improved security by developing a refinement mecha-
nism. The proposed algorithm provides isolation, distribution
of security devices and better traffic flow. For prevention from
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) downgrade
attack with a fake LTE BS, [122] provided the use of existing
pseudonym-based solution and a mechanism to update LTE
pseudonyms. Realizing the paging protocol security issues, an
attack called ToRPEDO is explored in [101].
A number of proposed techniques for access control based
on encryption, authentication and secret sharing have been of-
fered by multiple authors. In [123], Accountable and Privacy-
Enhanced Access Control (APAC) has been proposed to ensure
user privacy. The authors also authenticate the validity of the
protocol by implementing on limited experimental resources.
In [124], authors have proposed a unique authentication
scheme with biometric and password for Telecare Medicine
Information System (TMIS). The proposed technique pro-
vides forward secrecy, anonymity, less computational cost and
efficient authentication without involving remote server. In
[125], authors proposed to expand the existing state of the
art of management and policy specification by developing
formal verification scheme for access control policies. Based
on the update of ciphertext and computation outsourcing in
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Fig. 11. EAP Based Authentication Scheme with EAP AKA Method.
fog computing for IoT, authors of [126] proposed an access
control scheme. User’s data is encrypted using ABE and
then feed into cloud storage. A secure and efficient security
scheme has been offered in [127]. Based on Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (CP-ABPRE) and secret
sharing, security data sharing scheme for multiple users in
Online Social Networks (OSNs) has been proposed. In [127],
authors have also proposed a partial decryption construction to
reduce computation overhead of users by delegating decryp-
tion operations to OSNs, check ability mechanism to cross
check decrypted data by OSNs, attribute revocation method
for achieving backward and forward secrecy.
In [128], a node admission protocol BiAC (Bivariate poly-
nomial secret sharing) is proposed using a temporary and
secured MANET using a bivariate polynomial. The proposed
protocol is a non-interactive, efficient and secure admission
technique for secure sharing. To decentralized the system,
MANETs are allowed to share secretly and efficiently pairwise
secret keys without being assisted by any centralized support.
They have also proposed a technique through which on-the-fly
secure communication channel can be established by the pair
of MANET nodes. In [129], a generalized hierarchical access
control scheme called Shared Encryption Based construction
(SEBC) has identified by adding qualified users to the system
via perfect secret sharing and symmetric encryption. The
proposed protocol defines alternative methods of accessing the
system and it allows the distribution of duties to different
users. It also construct a secure key assignment schemes
called Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based Construction
(TBEBC), in this scheme encryption bases on public key
threshold broadcast.
Unique characteristics of ad-hoc networks allow the vulner-
ability of the system largely. In the form of ad hoc network
groups, access control to the system plays the fundamental
role. It prevents the access of intruder individual or group
to the system. In [130], authors have proposed an attack on
the famous Robust Access Control (RSA) proactive signature
scheme. According to authors, RSA scheme leaks some in-
formation which has been utilized by the intruders to rebuild
the entire shared secret. Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO)
relay cooperative scheme for a near and a far vehicle has been
studied in [131].Cooperative Jamming (CJ), protected zero
techniques and signal superposition has been adopted through
which near user decodes its signal and acts as a relay for
far user. Optimal secure transmission scheme has proposed
after careful analysis for eavesdropping security threats. In
the Downlink (DL) practical scenario with Channel Estima-
tion (CE) errors for C-RAN systems with optimal Remote
Radio Heads (RRHs), authors of [132] have investigated the
reliability and security performance. Authors of [133] have
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Fig. 12. 5G Authentication and Key Agreement scheme.
proposed a new methodology for performing semiautomatic
verification for implementation of access control policy in
Industrial Network Systems (INS). Authors used a twofold
model approach with consideration of two different system
views including the detailed description of the target physical
scheme and the abstract requirement of access control policies.
Precisely, authors in [133], used high-level implementation
framework called Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for
defining the policies.
Moreover, roaming events can happen very frequently in the
5G network due the utilization of local 5G networks or micro
5G operators [134]–[136]. Most of these local 5G operators
do not have a high level of security similar to the main MNOs.
Therefore, it is highly probable to encounter with a malicious
local 5G network as a serving network [108]. Therefore, 5G
authentication should be strong enough to avoid the connection
establishment with such networks.
C. Communication Security
5G communications aim at providing high data bandwidth,
low latency communication and extensive signal coverage to
support a wide range of verticals in 5G Eco system. Therefore,
5G communication will be updated along with the architectural
changes and integration of new technologies. However, these
changes can lead also to tremendous security challenges in the
future 5G mobile networks [137].
Attacks on 5G communication can be initiated at the differ-
ent segments such as UEs, the access networks and the mobile
operators core network [138]. To help understand the future
security issues and challenges affecting on 5G communication,
Table V summarizes the attacks related to different segments
of 5G communication. It is also important to explore threats
and attacks on legacy mobile systems (i.e., 2G/3G/4G). Some
of these attacks are still applicable in 5G systems as well [3].
Fig. 13 is illustrates the impacting point of each security issues
in 5G communication channel.
The 5G core network traffic can be classified in to two
types, i.e. control traffic and user data traffic. Both these traffic
types are vulnerable to different security threats. The key
security issue related to the control traffic is the lack of IP
level security. In the existing SDN based 5G core network,
higher layer (application layer) security protocols such as
Transport Layer Security (TLS)/ Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
sessions are used to secure the control channel communica-
tion. They have known IP level vulnerabilities such as IP
spoofing, message modification attacks, eavesdropping attacks,
TCP SYN DoS, IP spoofing and TCP reset attacks [119].
Therefore, it is necessary to use IP level security mechanisms
along with higher layer protection mechanisms. In [21], [72],
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Fig. 13. Security Issues related to 5G Communication.
TABLE V
SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO 5G COMMUNICATION
Attacked Segment Security Attack Description
User Equipment Botnet A botnet is a type of malware that can control a set of internet-connected devices. Mobile botnets can target
many mobile end- in an automated way to perform different attacks (i.e. DoS, reply) on 5G systems. This
threat is increasing as 5G will interconnect high power mobile phones [114].
Moreover, connectivity of IoT devices will open up new threat vector. Therese, IoT devices are vulnerable to
IoT botnet attacks. E.g. In 2016, The Mirai botnet affected millions of IP cameras [115].
Mobile Malware
Attacks
Mobile malwares allow attackers to steal the stored personal data on the device or even launch attacks (e.g.
DoS attacks) against other entities, such as other UE, the mobile access networks and the mobile operators
core network [24].
Access Network Attacks based on
false buffer status
reports
An attacker can exploit the buffer status reports of access network components such as BSs to obtain the
information such as packet scheduling, load balancing and admission control algorithms, to achieve his
malicious intents. Then attacker can send false buffer status reports by pretending as legitimate UE to jeopardize
the operations [24], [25].
Message
Insertion Attack
Message Insertion Attacks are possible in 5G networks to initiate the DoS attacks. For instance, false flaw
table updates can be used to overload SDN devices. In addition, An attacker can inject control protocol data
units (C-PDU) to the system during the wake up time to preform DoS attack against the new arriving UE
[21], [116].
Micro cell At-
tacks
The physical size of BSs are drastically reducing and they be place in indoor locations such as malls, public
places, stadiums and hospitals. Moreover, the use of new frequencies such as mmWave frequencies will also
fuel the use of such micro BSs. However, these micro base stations are not physically secure as macro BSs
used in pre-5G networks. Moreover, increment of number of BS will increase the potential vulnerability points
in 5G Networks [117], [118]
Core Network DDoS Attacks DDoS attacks can be launched in a form of Signaling Amplification and HSS saturation by a using botnet to
control a large number of infected UEs. [34].
TLS/SSL Attacks The TLS/SSL based communication used in SDN based Core network is vulnerable to attacks such as TCP SYN
(Synchronization) DDoS, RC4 biases in TLS, Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS (BEAST) attack, Compression
Ratio Info-leak Made Easy (CRIME) attack, LUCKY 13 attack and POODLE attack [119].
SDN Scanner Attackers can passively collect network information such as IP of SDN controller and key network elements by
analyzing SDN traffics. It is possible to perform various attacks such as DoS, TCP reset, replay and spoofing
attacks by using the collected information [25], [119].
[139], authors proposed an IPSec based security architecture
to secure the control channel communication.
In large-scale SDN networks such as mobile networks,
multiple SDN controllers are used to control different network
segments [140]. The SDN east/west-bound interface is used
to establish Inter-Controller Communication (ICC) between
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Fig. 14. Security Requirements for Access Control Network.
these multiple SDN controllers. This helps in sharing control
information to perform various network functions such as
security policy synchronization, mobility management, traffic
management and network monitoring.
Thus, the security of these ICC channels is indispensable
in ensuring the proper operation of the above functions. If
the core ICC channel is compromised, then the whole system
will be compromised regardless of what happens in the rest
of the network. ICC channels of current SDN systems are
vulnerable to a wide range of IP and web-based attacks
such as DDoS, replay, IP port scans and Domain Name
Server (DNS) hijacking [141], [142]. In addition, 5G ICC
channels are also vulnerable to other physical threats such
as technical failures, human errors as well as disaster failures.
Inevitably, 5G ICC will be also vulnerable to a wide range
of cyber and physical threats. Moreover, the existing SDN
based communication systems have considered only the impact
of cyber-attacks. For instance, Lam et. al. proposed to used
Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) protocol based secure key
exchange mechanism to enhance the security of the east/west-
bound data transmission in a multi-controller SDN networks
[142]. However, this proposal did not address many known
cyber-attacks and the physical threats.
While the industrial state of the art in 5G security advances
in a reactive manner, current research in adaptive security
offers a more flexible and resilient approach. However, security
solutions in the current 4G networks are designed by different
vendors; most are vendor proprietary solutions. Therefore, the
mix and match use and real-time synchronization of different
security solutions are extremely difficult or impossible in
todays networks [143]. Thus, it is not possible to modify the
existing system in real-time to prevent the ongoing attacks and
new flexible security systems are required for 5G networks.
Moreover, security at the physical layer is an important area
in 5G communications. A state of the art analysis of physical
layer security is presented in the Section V.
D. Encryption
Encryption is particularly important to ensure the confiden-
tiality of data. Due to the rich set of new network services, E2E
encryption is significant in 5G domain. This can be used in
different segments of the network to prevent the unauthorized
access to the mobile data.
The radio traffic is encrypted in 5G at the Packet Data
Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer [82]. Similar to that of
4G LTE network, three different 128-bit encryption keys are
used for user plane, Non-Access Stratum (NAS) and Access
Stratum (AS). Moreover, the some of the 4G encryption
algorithms will use in 5G New Radio (NR). As per 3GPP
5G standards [144], the same null, SNOW3G and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) based EPS Encryption Algorithms
(EEA) algorithms will be used in used in 5G as well. However,
the identifiers are has been changed in 5G. 4G EEA (EPS
Encryption Algorithm) is redefined as NEA (NR Encryption
Algorithm) in 5G [145].
Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communication (URLLC) is
one of the major traffic class in 5G. In the RAN 5G NR
achieves high resilience against security threats and attacks by
deploying a single BS as two split units, called a central unit
and a distributed unit [82]. This split helps to customizable
deployment of security sensitive functions of the 5G NR
access. For instance, user plane encryption is implemented at
a secure central location and non-security sensitive functions
are implemented in less secure distributed locations.
Moreover, encryption plays a vital role in privacy protection
in 5G. To comply the latest privacy directives such as General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [146], [147] and the
ongoing review of ePrivacy Directive [148], [149] in Europe,
it is required to be considering the protection of privacy is
a high priority requirement in the 5G systems. As a result,
the subscriber privacy protection is included by design in
5G systems. In 5G subscriber identifiers, both long-term and
temporary are protected by using a concealment mechanism
which is based on the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption
Scheme (ECIES) [150] and uses the home operator’s public
key [151].
In addition, ESTI technical committee on cybersecurity
recently released two encryption specifications for Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE) which can be used in 5G and
IoT. This is an asymmetric, multi-party cryptographic scheme
that bundles access control with data encryption. The first
specification was focusing on the personal data protection on
IoT devices, cloud and mobile services when the secure access
to data has to be given to multiple parties. The second spec-
ification focuses on the trust models, functions and protocols
to control access to data in 5G networks [152], [153].
Moreover, the IMSI encryption [154] can be used in 5G to
eliminating the threats of IMSI catchers [155]. IMSI catchers
eavesdrop and track the subscribers. It violates the their pri-
vacy [155]. In [154], authors propose a new IMSI encryption
algorithm to achieve this goal. A mobile device needs to
generate a fresh pair of its own public/private asymmetric
keys and random number. This is possible in 5G as the current
USIMs are now capable of performing randomized asymmetric
encryption operations [100], [156].
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IV. SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO KEY TECHNOLOGIES
IN 5G
This section contains some of the most challenging security
issues related to the key 5G technologies, i.e. SDN/SDMN,
NFV, MEC, cloud computing and network slicing. Further-
more, the impact of these technologies on 5G security is also
discussed in this section.
A. Security Challenges Related to SDN/SDMN
SDN arose as an attempt to present network novelties
quickly, and to drastically streamline and automate the man-
agement of huge networks. Logically, the centralized control
plane monitors and controls the whole system in SDN for
packet forwarding inside the network [157]. Among several
other technologies, SDN is one of the future 5G technologies
that provides high reliability and high speed for the surge in
network data and nodes for the upcoming years [158] [159].
Using two threat models, authors of [160] provided a com-
parative analysis between traditional and SDN network. The
proposed model emphasizes a vital network assets required by
the conventional production networks. For the coexistence of
heritage and SDN-enabled networks, authors of [51] used three
synchronization strategies for designing a data model. The
proposed model stores the information for keeping Network
Management System and controller synchronized.
Authors of [161] have proposed an security architecture
based on big data analysis of secure cluster management
for cluster maximized the control plane. It also includes an
authentication technique for managing the cluster and an
approach to optimize the control plane.
Authors of [162] have addressed the security vulnerabilities
in 5G SDMN, network function virtualization and cloud
computing by presenting a multi-tier component based security
architecture. For raising SDMN security in control and data
planes, the proposed technique contains five components in-
cluding policy-based communication, secure communication,
event management, security information and security defined
monitoring. A robust security architecture for SDN-Based
5G networks was proposed in [138]. Here, the illegal re-
quests from malicious attackers are identified by adding extra
cryptographic authentication, termed synchronize secret. Thus,
this scheme uses preload secrets to separate the attacks from
regular network requests. Finally, Table VI summarizes the
security issues related to SDN/SDMN and their relevance to
pre-5G and 5G networks.
B. Network Function Virtualization Related Security Issues
The prior-5G mobile networks have network functionalities
which are purely based on specific hardware and software.One
physical node in the network plays a specific role. This will
hinder the deployment and expansion on telecommunication
networks in various ways. First, prior-5G mobile operators had
to maintain a complex carrier network with a large variety of
proprietary nodes and hardware appliances. Deploying new
network services were difficult and costly. Also, it also took
a long time to implement them. Adding a new service basi-
cally means that the network requires just another hardware.
This needs to be integrated in the network. Due the rapid
development of mobile network technologies, these services
are quickly reaching to end of life. Therefore, these network
services are needed upgrade quite frequently. However, this
operation is quite expensive in current mobile networks due
to existing procure-design, integrate-deploy cycle. Moreover,
large and increasing variety of proprietary hardware appliances
in operators network make it so complex and expensive to
manage [179].
Thus, network operators were looking for a new means to
make the network more flexible and simple by minimizing
dependence on hardware constraints. NFV is a novel con-
cept which refine the network equipment architecture. NFV
virtualizes network services which were traditionally run on
proprietary and dedicated hardware. Now, they can store in
a cloud as a software application. The network is built by
using commodity hardware and required network function can
be dynamically deployed on such hardware according to the
requirement.
Fig. 15. Threat Vectors in NFV Architecture.
NFV can deliver several benefits. It reduces equipment
costs (CAPEX) by removing under utilized equipment and
eliminating the necessity to use proprietary hardware devices.
NFV can significantly speed up the time to the market of
new network services by reducing innovation life cycle of
network operators. Furthermore, NFV enables the availability
of network appliance multi-version and multi-tenancy. This
allows a single hardware platform to share between different
applications, services and tenants. NFV is also encouraging
innovation to bring new services and generate new revenue
streams. Thus, NFV will play a vital role in 5G network and
one of the fundamental technology in 5G networks.
However, several security concerns found in 5G NFV
systems. These security issues are mainly impacting on the
resiliency as well as the overall quality of service in 5G
networks. These attacks are ranging from physical hardware
level to NFV architecture level. Specially, security attacks
on software level components such as virtual infrastructure
manager (VIM) got compromised other vulnerabilities can also
arise exponentially [35]. Fig. 15 present the threat vectors
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TABLE VI
SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO SDN/SDMN
Threat Vector Security Attack Relevance
to pre-5G
Relevance
to 5G
Data Channel Forged or faked traffic flows Yes Yes
Eavesdropping Yes Yes
Flow modification No Yes
MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks No Yes
Replay Attacks No Yes
Switches Clone or deviate network traffic No Yes
Forged requests to overload the controller or neighboring switches No Yes
Overload TCAM (Ternary Content-Addressable Memory) No Yes
Fake controller based attacks No Yes
Manipulating switch software Yes Yes
Control Channel TCP level attacks Yes Yes
TLS/SSL attacks No Yes
SDN scanner attacks No Yes
Lack of authentication No Yes
Message modification attacks Yes Yes
Controller DoS attacks No Yes
Fake switches No Yes
Software Vulnerabilities No Yes
Backdoor Entries No Yes
Attacks of East-West Channels No Yes
Attacks via apps No Yes
Application Plane lack of mechanisms to ensure trust between the controller and management apps No Yes
Buggy software No Yes
Unauthorized access via apps No Yes
Insecure storage of apps No Yes
Admin Stations Eavesdropping Yes Yes
Buggy software Yes Yes
DoS attacks Yes Yes
Replay attacks Yes Yes
Back door entrance Yes Yes
Message modification attacks Yes Yes
Software/OS vulnerabilities Yes Yes
Network Management Lack of trusted resources for forensics and remediation Yes Yes
Monitoring issues Yes Yes
Virtualization related issues No Yes
related to NFV and Table VII summarizes the attacks related
to threat vectors.
Comprehensive surveys of security issues related to NFV
can be found in [35], [164], [180]–[182]. In addition, security
issues in VNFs is presented in [170]. Security considerations
for NFV cloud-based mobile virtual network operators are
discussed in [183]. In [177], authors propose a new security
mechanism based on Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel
SGX) to securely isolate the states of NFV applications to pre-
vent the security vulnerabilities of stealing and manipulating
the internal states of NFV applications that share same physi-
cal resources. Proposals for extending the current NFV orches-
trator to have the capability of managing security mechanisms
related 5G networks is proposed in [184]–[186]. In [187],
authors define, review and evaluate Network Security Function
Virtualization (NSFV) concept over Openflow infrastructure.
NSFV has potential the security challenges related to network
service provisioning, network monitoring and E2E security 5G
networks. Security policy frameworks for NFV networks were
proposed in [188], [189]. A security architecture for NFV-
based communication networks is proposed in [190].
C. MEC and Cloud Related Security Issues
MEC is the network architecture that allows the cloud com-
puting process usually on the edge of the network. In MEC,
the functions required for the operation of the network occur
near the UE and far from the network operator. Moreover,
Edge devices are more vulnerable to physical attacks than
cloud devices. In edge computing, the billing or changing data
route occur through edge components only. Visited and home
networks also depend on edge components. The core network
can only keep a track of data received by the edge user to
another UE via periodic polling [191].
Many authors provided solutions for some of the security
challenges in MEC, cloud and combined MEC and Cloud
networks. Fig. 16 depicts some of the relevant solutions of
MEC and cloud computing networks. Zero-watermarking and
visual cryptography are two proposed approaches to provide
secure multimedia content and multi shared data. In [192],
authors used above technique for providing biometric security
solution for face images without affecting the pictorial worth
of the image. Authors provide copyright protection to authen-
ticate the multimedia content. In [193], authors have proposed
a mobile edge computing framework for secure and shared
user location in a crowded place using D2D communication
with fog or edge nodes.
In [194], authors have proposed a distributed reputation
management system to address the security issues in Vehicular
Edge Computing (VEC). Authors of [195] have proposed a
soft hesitant fuzzy rough set for appropriate security service
JOURNAL OF LATEX IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS, JULY 2019 21
TABLE VII
SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION
Attacked component Security Attack Description
1 NFV MANO (Man-
agement and Orches-
tration)
Malicious misconfig-
uration
An attacker get legitimate access to the orchestrator and manipulates the orchestrator configurations
to change the operation of VNFs or grant access to run a modified Virtual Network Function (VNF)
[163]
SDN controller ex-
ploits
When NFV and SDN deployed together in 5G, the vulnerabilities related to SDN controllers or faulty
controller can jeopardize the operation on NFV [164].
DNS amplification at-
tack
An attacker use public ally accessible open DNS servers to flood the orchestration with DNS response
traffic [163], [165]
Excessive log attack Compromised VNFs can generate a large amount of logs which needed to be checked by VIM. If the
compromised VNFs can generate enough number of fake logs, it can prevent VIM being checked the
logs related to legitimate VNFs. In some cases, these fake logs can override the genuine logs [164]
Log leak attack Compromised VNFs can leak the infrastructure logs from one VNF operator to another operator to
extract sensitive operational information [166]
Privilege escalation An attacker misuse the limited control dedicated to authenticated user to gain control over VIM to
manipulate the management, resource provisioning and performance evaluation of operations of VMs
[25]
steal data form
ephemeral storage
In a NFV environment such as OpenStack, attackers can steal data such as cryptographic keys from
other VNFs ephemeral storage during Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) live block migration since
it does not properly creates all expected files [167]
2 VNF (Virtual
Network Functions)
Inter-operability
issues
Different VNFs are developed by different VNF providers and they have different level of security
polices. The mismatch between these differences can lead to vulnerabilities when they are deployed
in a same system. [168].
DoS/DDoS Many variety of DoS/DDoS attacks targeted services such as VNFs hosted in the Cloud, e.g attack
on Bitbucket [169]. The impact of DDoS is even greater NFV since the attack could propagate to
untargeted VNFs that are hosted on the same physical host [170], [171].
Software flaws Since VNFs are software, they are vulnerable to software flaws which can lead to unintended
behaviours. For instance, these software flaws can be used to bypass firewall restrictions or do a
buffer overflow to execute arbitrary code [170].
VM escape attack A malicious VM can escape out of the virtualization environment and execute arbitrary code within
the hypervisor to compromised it [172].
VNF Manipulation
Attacks
An attacker misuse the privileges of compromised hypervisor to install kernel root kit in VNF’s OS
and manipulate the VNF [164].
VNF location shift at-
tack
An attacker can migrate an compromised VNF to a different location which has less security or privacy
policies to gain addition access to the system [164]
3 VM (Virtual
Machines)
VM Migration attacks During the VM migration, MitM attacker can modify arbitrary VM OS or application states [173]
Side-channel attacks An attacker obtains the information in an indirect manner to attack the targeted VMs. For instance,
attacker can measure the frequency of other VMs, that are are paused to predict the pause time of
targeted VMs [174]
Scheduler Attacks An attacker use the vulnerabilities in the hypervisors scheduler to acquire system resources for the
malicious VM at the expense of a victim VM [172]
Lack of Isolation Due to the lack of proper isolation between VMs, an attacker can utilize a compromised VM to
communicate and propagate security threats to co-hosted VMs on the same physical host [175]
VM Data theft A malicious VM which is infected with malware can use the memory bus or cache contention to
stealthily steal data, e.g. cryptographic keys from the co-resident VMs [176]
VM rollback attack An attacker uses an older snapshot of VM without the concern of VM owner to bypass the security
system and obtain the access the system. This attack is possible after an already comprised hypervisor
roll back to its the previous snapshot [176]
4 Hypervisor/
virtualization layer
VM/guest OS (Oper-
ating System) manip-
ulation
The guest OS vulnerabilities such as OS command injection, SQL injection, buffer overflow or missing
authentication for critical function can be utilized to attack the hypervisor in the hosting OS [35]
Isolation Failure Risk Lack of proper isolation can be use to break into a hypervisor by compromising some VNFs running
over it [164].
Exhausting Hypervi-
sor
some VNF applications can be manipulated to consume high CPU, hard disk, and memory resources
so that, they can exhaust the hypervisor [164].
Exceeding Logs
Troubleshooting
Failure
VNFs can be compromised to generate a huge amount of log entries on the hypervisor. Then, it will
difficult to analyze logs from other VNFs, especially, when the initial entries in the log files are deleted.
Insider attacks When a malicious administrator has the root access to the hypervisor and by using a search operation.
He can extract the user ID, passwords and SSH keys from the memory dump, which in turn violates
user privacy and data confidentiality
5 Physical Hardware Disk failure, Physical
attack
A physical attack (i.e. power cutout, link break and fire) on hardware will terminate the availability
of hardware resources for VMs [35]
Code execution on the
physical host
A compromise VM can execute on the host physical hardware to read/modify the stored data, deny
the physical resources or disrupt the services for co-located VNFs [171]
State Manipulation
Attack
Attackers steal and manipulate the internal states of NFV applications that share a same physical
resource [177]
Resource Interference
Attack: I/O
A malicious VM or VNF can also steal the scheduling characteristics of the hypervisor to overload
I/O resources available for other co-located VMs or VNFs [171], [178]
Resource Interference
Attack: CPU
A malicious VM or VNF can over utilize the CPU resources of host hardware to deny the availability
of processing resources for co-located VMs or VNFs [171], [178]
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Fig. 16. Security Mechanisms for MEC and Cloud Network Systems.
selection in real-time multi-criteria decision making problems
for Fog and Mobile-Edge Computing (FMEC). For enhancing
the security trust for Mobile Social Networks (MSNs), au-
thors of [196] have presented a social trust scheme for trust
based MSNs with MEC. They resorted to the knowledge of
social relationships for improving security and efficiency. For
supporting IoT in MEC, authors of [197] have scrutinize to
security issues in IoT applications of MEC.
In the new era of 5G technology, constant generation of
enough data by several applications certainly needs a cloud
based system. It is unwise to store the data in the end devices
due to limitation of space, energy, reliability and vulnerability.
Integration of mobile computing and cloud computing together
extends the limitation of storage with Mobile Cloud Com-
puting (MCC). Mobile users can save data at any time from
anywhere. However, it faces a number of challenges in terms
of privacy, data integrity and security. A number of authors
provided certain security mechanism for respective scenarios
that are suitable for the MCC system security.
Authors of [198], [199] proposed security protocols for
MCC. In [198] authors designed a secured and efficient
system for data distribution in MCC. The proposed system
provides data authentication, privacy, integrity and flexible
data distribution with access control without involving a third
party. Considering the security issues in MCC, authors of
[199] have proposed a chaotic fuzzy transformation method of
allowing search process of user’s secured encrypted data on
the cloud. The proposed scheme guaranteed the confidentiality
and privacy. Authors of [200] have proposed a light weighted
data-sharing algorithm (LDSS-CP-ABE) for MCC.
With a suitable structure of access control technology
Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE), authors of [200], [201]
have adopted it to offer cloud security in the systems. A proxy
encryption and a ciphertext-policy ABE scheme have designed
by the authors of [201] for P2P storage cloud. Authors have
also proposed an efficient, fine-gained and ciphertext-policy
for a secure P2P storage Cloud access control mechanism.
In [202], authors have designed a flexible, efficient and
secure retrieval system based on fog and cloud computing.
Authors of [203] have presented an algorithm for workflow
applications on federated clouds by introducing an entropy-
based method of quantifing the most reliable workflow de-
ployment and fulfill security requirements by extending the
Bell-LaPadula Multi-Level security model. Authors of [204]
proposed a deterrent-based scheme to secure the knowledge of
data exchange between various data owners from a dishonest
cloud server. Authors of [205] proposed a secure data self-
destructing scheme that serves as a Key-Policy ABE with
Time-Specified Attributes (KP-TSABE) for cloud computing.
The proposed scheme supports the time interval labelled
ciphertext with time instant associated private key. Authors
of [206] proposed Smart-Frame that provides a secure cloud
computing based framework for information management of
big data on smart grids.
D. Network Slicing related Security Issues
Recently the rule of divide and conquer has been chosen
for 5G. Thus, Network Slicing (NS) concept is the integral
part of 5G. It is a specific form of network virtualization
techniques to deploy multiple logical/virtual networks to run
on top of a single shared physical network infrastructure.
The main purpose of using network slicing is partition the
physical network resources to optimally group the different
traffic, isolate from other tenants and configure the network
resources at a macro level [207].
Each slice is separated in terms of a case/field with the
specific required operations. The logical slicing divides a
single common physical network into various virtual, complete
E2E networks. It provides complete isolation for these virtual
networks from each other in terms of access, transport, device
and core network. These slices are dedicated to different types
of services and scenarios. The target during division is to cus-
tomize and optimize each network in terms of resources, QoS,
and security. Therefore, NS is utilized in E2E manner which
consists not just networking resources but also computing and
storage resources.
The key benefit of NS is that, it allows MNOs to partition
their network and network resources to accommodate very dif-
ferent users and different traffic classes. For instance, NS can
be used to simultaneously accommodate different 5G traffic
classes i.e massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC),
enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), and Ultra Reliable
Low Latency Communication (URLLC) on a same physical
network infrastructure. These traffic classes have very different
characteristics. For instance, mMTC is related to providing
the connectivity for a very large number of IoT devices,
which may have very low throughput. However, eMBB has
the opposite properties as this traffic class is focusing on
transporting very high bandwidth content and services.
The concept of network slicing is somehow similar to VPNs
(Virtual Private Network). However, 5G calls for new methods
of slicing as it has a wider scope and requires implement
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in most challenging environments. Network slicing can be
considered as on-demand networks. They can be deployed,
eliminate and removed from any network dramatically. Net-
work slicing is can be used in RAN as well. Here, a unit
physical network is divided into several virtual networks that
can support various RANs. It is envisaged that network slicing
will play a major role in 5G as it can improve the flexibility,
operation of the infrastructure and the distribution of resources.
Security of NS is an important factor for successful de-
ployment of network slicing [207]. For instance, a control-
ling mechanism is required for the inter-network slices com-
munication including the management plane communication,
signaling, undesired communication between functioning and
network operator. For the communication between functions,
slices and interfaces between them, a proper mechanism is re-
quired to ensure a secure operation within expected parameters
along with operators security requirements. If the communi-
cation channel between different slices is not secure, attackers
can disrupt the communication between slices. This will leads
to resources under utilization as life cycle management of
slices will not happen properly [208].
Within an operator network, neither a host (physical) nor
a network slice manager can be considered as impersonal if
the network slice manager dynamically create or destroy a
network slice and map and load them to accessible the phys-
ical host platform. For a safe and secure transmission, both
network slice manager and the physical host must recognize
each other through authentication. Similarly, in the case with
more network slice managers within an operator network; all
network slice managers must authenticate each other [209].
Particularly it is difficult protect the virtual elements that
run within the slice have destroyed, moved or replaced with
another newly created instance. It might have done by a
malicious or non-malicious actor. An impersonation attack
against a network slice instance impact on all of its services.
Therefore, authentication is required for network slice instance
as well [144], [208].
Each slice has different protocols and network services with
different security level due to the requirement or the assigned
task, it needs to perform or may be due to different latency
requirements. However, this must not affect the security level
of another slice. Recommendation is to design a baseline
security level collectively for all the layers without any excuse.
For the unavailability of baseline scheme, all layer security
must be equally good and protectable. In addition, when UEs
are capable of accessing all network slices separately then
either they should authenticate themselves before accessing
each slice or they need to first access the low security slice
by authentication then access high security slice [208], [210].
DoS attack is possible for exhausted resources. Exhaustion
of common resources for all slices provides high probability of
attack on other slices too. Provision of capping resources and
optionally ring-fencing resources assure maximum and mini-
mum recommended levels of resources. Ring-fencing network
resources provide ability to run resources for security protocol
even in case of exhaustion [208].
Another attack is the side channel attack, which results
in the leakage of any cryptographic information. Particularly,
when two slices share some primary hardware. In case of any
cryptographic information leakage, the security of the sharing
hardware device may compromise. It can be prevented with
the strong isolation of virtual machines that prevents the code
exposure of one machine due to the code exposure of an-
other machine. Moreover, in case of different slice sensitivity
level, it is better to avoid co-hosting on the same hardware
slices [144]. In hybrid deployment models where the operator
deploys the combination of virtual and regular functions.
Such deployments must keep at least regular security level.
Utilization of multiple services by the user with different
slices at the same time requires a proper sealing between
slices. Proper investigation will provide a better solution in this
context. The offered security mechanism should exist not only
in the UE but also in the network for better protection [208].
Table VIII summarizes the key security issues in network
slicing related to 5G.
TABLE VIII
SECURITY THREATS RELATED TO NETWORK SLICING
Threats Description
Attacks on inter-
network slices
communication
An attackers can disrupt the communication be-
tween slices to prevent the proper life cycle man-
agement of slices.
Impersonation at-
tack
An attacker can impersonate as an physical host
platform to allocate unavailable resources. More-
over, an attacker can impersonate as network slice
manager to steal network slice creation parameter
Security policy
mismatch
Variance of security policies and security protocols
for different slices allow attackers to access the NS
system and control entities via less secure slice.
DoS attack An attacker perform an DoS attack either on vital-
ization platform or physical resources to exhaust the
available network resources for other slices
Side channel at-
tacks
An attacker gain access to one slice and attack the a
set of slice which share the same primary hardware.
Privacy attacks Infrastructure providers or VNF suppliers steal the
cross slice user information.
Hypervisor
attacks
Perform attacks against the hypervisor to jeopar-
dize the virtualization of resources. These attacks
includes, software erros in hypervisor, backdoor
entry via hosting OS, DoS attacks and attacking the
hardware resources
V. PHY SECURITY
PLS in offering safety measures for data secrecy. It has
received a noteworthy research interest. The growth towards
5G wireless communication positions new challenges in phys-
ical layer security community. This target can be achieved, by
using advanced channel codes or by resorting to introducing
key generation. There are two main candidate channel codes
are identified by 3GPP community [230] namely, Polor codes
[231] and LDPC codes [232]. The main technical challenges
which continue to be unsettled at a substantial level while
there are many ad-hoc solutions are presented in the literature
in relation 5G networks. This section highlights the potential
PHY layer security challenges and current presented solutions
in other key 5G technologies such as OFDMA, NOMA, UAV,
mmWave, massive MIMO, channel coding, energy harvesting
and some other related issues. Fig. 17 and Table IX give a
brief overview of this section.
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TABLE IX
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY A BRIEF REVIEW
Ref Key Technologies Considered Scenario Goal and achievements
[211]
OFDM-SC, PLS, URLLC,
FDD, TDD
Single cell SISO OFDM for DL OFDMA, Rayleigh
multi-path fading, direct communication with QPSK
modulation and knowledge of CSI and security tech-
niques for eavesdroppers.
Secrecy and reliability through OFDM-SIS algorithm
based on URLLC.
[212]
PLS, AN, Jamming posi-
tion selection, polar codes
and Bhattacharyya param-
eters
A DL communication system with fixed fading coef-
ficients, no spatial freedom and no additional power.
Improvement of secrecy rate with AN aided polar
coding and sub optimal jamming position selection
using greedy algorithm and channel polarization.
Authors have also used cryptography.
[213]
A number of eavesdropper
and relay,
DF network,
single antenna relays,
Multi-hop massive cooper-
ative relaying
Single cell ad-hoc HD communication system
with multiple relay cooperation, cooperation among
eavesdroppers with MRC of wiretapped signal and
independent eavesdroppers with and without MRC.
Better PLS of 5G large scale relay networks. Authors
proposed GD-CAES, MM-CAES, and DA-CAES
using graph theory.
[120]
Stochastic geometry, ac-
cess selection, optimization
Single Cell DL communication system with small
and large scale Rayleigh fading.
Maximized secrecy throughput with proposed search
algorithm using stochastic geometry.
[214]
Stochastic Geometry A Single cell and multiple antenna on BS for UL
NOMA with quasi-static Rayleigh fading, unknown
CSI, imperfect SIC, and passive eavesdropping.
Effective secrecy throughput with stochastic geome-
try.
[215]
NOMA with cooperative
relaying and beamforming
A Single cell SISO DL NOMA cooperative commu-
nication system. Relay is considered to be far from
BS and near eavesdropper.
Maximized secrecy rate region of LUs with cooper-
ative communication.
[216]
Alternative search method
(ASM), successive convex
approximation, monotonic
optimization
HetNet, DL, PD-NOMA with Rayleigh fading, mul-
tiple eavesdroppers.
Optimized sum secrecy rate based on optimization.
[217]
Stochastic geometry Single cell, DL NOMA with Rayleigh fading chan-
nel, randomly deployed users and eavesdroppers.
Secrecy for NOMA using stochastic geometry.
[218]
Stochastic geometry, single
antenna, multiple antenna
Single cell, DL NOMA with Rayleigh fading, ran-
domly deployed users and eavesdroppers.
Secrecy in NOMA for single and multiple antennas
using stochastic geometry.
[219]
PS-NOMA, optimization Single cell, DL, OFDMA with Rayleigh fading. Secrecy in PD NOMA via proposed iterative algo-
rithm and optimization.
[220]
OFDMA Single cell, DL, OFDMA with Rayleigh fading. Resource allocation for maximized fairness for the
user’s secrecy rate with the proposed three low
polynomial complexity heuristic algorithms and op-
timization.
[221]
Massive MIMO Single cell MIMO, DL, TDD, block fading, training
phase and no training phase jamming.
Secrecy in MIMO with the proposed δ−conjugate
beamforming in mMIMO.
[222]
ZFBF, MIMO HetNet Macro and pico cells, DL, TDD, Rayleigh fading and
MIMO is combined with HetNet.
Improved secrecy with MIMO HetNet based on
mMIMO HetNet systems.
[223]
OFDMA and CRNs single cell Trade-off between secrecy and robustness with the
proposed iterative algorithm and optimization.
[224]
OFDMA and CN Single cell with a primary and secondary links,
DL, OFDMA with Rayleigh fading in a cooperative
scenario.
Average throughput for open and private information
via proposed cross layer scheduling and spectrum
access.
[225]
SWIPT Single cell, DL, OFDMA, Rayleigh fading with open
and private information to multiple users.
Secrecy and optimum harvest power with the propsed
iterative and two-step algorithm.
[78]
WSNs, cooperative jam-
ming and AF
A single cell, DL OFDMA cooperative scenario with
small scale fading and CJ.
Secure network with proposed near optimal resource
allocation algorithm.
[226]
OFDMA Single cell UL OFDMA system with Rayleigh fad-
ing, DF and known CSI.
Secure resource allocation with optimization ap-
proach.
[227]
OFDMA Single cell DL, OFDMA flat fading direct commu-
nication with perfect CSI.
Secrecy rate or fairness using jamming power.
[228]
OFDMA Single cell, DL, OFDMA, large and small scale
fading with known CSI.
Secrecy.
[229]
OFDMA and CRNs single cell with primary and secondary BS, DL,
OFDMA, Rayleigh fading cooperative scenario with
unknown CSI.
Secure communication in CRNs with optimization.
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Fig. 17. 5G Network Security in Physical Layer.
A. OFDMA and Non Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA)
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Fig. 18. Security challenges and solutions for OFDMA PLS. When BS
observes the outside world then take decision and then act accordingly. In
such case, OFDMA is combined with CRNs.
OFDMA is superior among all the medium access technolo-
gies. This improves the spectrum efficiency largely and fulfills
the requirement of 5G technology. There exist several other
benefits of using OFDMA including Inter Carrier Interchange
(ICI) and the Inter Symbol Interchange (ISI) problems. It is
one of the latest and on-demand technology. However, it faces
few security challenges in its implementation. This section
contains the identified key problems and the solutions related
to the security of OFDMA. However, it still offers an open
research area for the scholars and scientists. Fig. 18 shown the
basic infrastructure with certain security issues in OFDMA.
Researchers often utilized joint power and resource allo-
cation techniques to provide better secrecy in the network .
In [220], authors intended to provide a solution for assigning
sub-channels and power in a multi-user DL OFDMA system
to boost the max-min fairness standard over the users secrecy
rate. In [227], authors proposed to utilized jammer’s power in
a DL OFDMA system for improving secrecy rate or fairness.
It has proved by the authors that the maximum jammers power
offers the maximum secrecy rate. Authors of [225], studied the
power splitting ratio selection and joint sub-carrier allocation
for secure DL OFDMA-based SWIPT networks.
Cooperative jamming or jamming techniques are also help-
ful to provide high secrecy rate. The authors of [78], in-
vestigated joint sub-carrier allocation, sub-carrier pairing and
power allocation for a secure two-way relay in OFDMA WSNs
with and without CJ. Without CJ, the authors proposed near
optimal resource allocation algorithm which appropriately al-
locates resources with the improved secrecy sum rate. With the
CJ keeping the Relay Station (RS) up-to-date, eavesdroppers
are kept confused. For a secure OFDMA Decode and Forward
(DF) networks, authors have proposed a scheme for limited
rate feedback resource allocation.
In [228], authors have proposed AN generation and removal
methods for OFDMA based SWIPT. Jointly optimization of
transmitting power and SC allocation for AN signals helped
in maximizing the sum secrecy rate for Information Receivers
(IRs) that are subjected to constraints of individual harvested
power of Energy Receivers (ERs).
Based on OFDMA, Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs)
also provide network security better than other techniques. In
[223], authors have proposed several strategies for providing
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trade-off between robustness and secrecy of the system in
a secure ergodic resource allocation (SERA) problems in
relay assisted OFDMA based underlay CRNs with passive
eavesdroppers. This is called Secure Robust Ergodic Resource
Allocation (SRERA) and in [229], authors have proposed two
cooperative communication schemes with MRC and without
MRC in a OFDMA based CRNs for a secure system of
communication. In a OFDMA based CR network, the author
of [224] has proposed an algorithm for cross-layer scheduling
and spectrum access to optimize the average throughput of
private and open information.
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Fig. 19. Security challenges and solutions for NOMA PLS. When BS observes
the outside world then take decision and then act accordingly. In such case,
NOMA is combined with CRNs.
Another innovative efficient technology NOMA, recognized
as one of the candidates of 5G technology. NOMA provides
several advantages; high spectrum utilization, fairness, QoS,
robustness, data rate, and throughput over other existing
technologies [233]. M-NOMA [234], [235] is a modulation
based energy efficient technique which provides better system
complexity, interference, data rate and SER. Due to the least
spectrum division, it is certainly vulnerable to a number
of security threats. Therefore, before the implementation of
NOMA in the real world, a number of authors provided
suitable way to tackle the upcoming probable security issues.
Fig. 19 shows security challenges and solutions for NOMA
PLS.
For the secrecy of NOMA, a number of authors were
focusing on providing secure regions to the legitimate users
(LUs) for better security. In [214], authors have provided
a protected zone around the LUs or established an eaves-
dropper’s exclusion region. In [215], a perfect cooperative
scheme is presented that depends on the number of relays
and their distances from the BS and eavesdroppers. The target
is to optimize the secrecy rate region of the LUs subject
to the power constraints on the relays transmission and the
BS. As of [217], to enhance the secrecy performance in
NOMA large scale networks, expanding the choice of the
protected regions or reducing the choice of the user regions is
required. Additionally according to [218] by generating AN,
BS communicates with randomly distributed NOMA users via
single or multiple antennas.
In [216], authors proposed a scheme which prevents an
eavesdropper from performing Successive Interference Can-
cellation (SIC) (even if they know the channel ordering).
Moreover, authors formulated an optimization problem of joint
sub-carrier and power allocation to increase secrecy rate in DL
PD-NOMA HetNet with multiple eavesdroppers.
In [219], authors studied the optimal design of allocated
power, decoding order, and transmission rate for maintaining
secrecy in PD-NOMA. In the considered scenario, channels of
the eavesdropper with passive eavesdropping are unknown. In
[236], authors discussed the PLS is combined with NOMA and
CR networks . The wiretap network modelled for the technical
requirement of combined CR NOMA. In [237], authors have
offered a Chaos NOMA (C-NOMA) for secure multiple access
transmission. They offered another C-MIMO scheme as a
channel coded communication scheme using communication
principle of chaos. In [238], authors have proposed a low
complexity Sub-Carrier Assignment Scheme (SCAS-1) in a
NOMA using amplify-and-forward two way relay wireless
networks. The proposed scheme jointly assigns secure sub-
carrier and power to the system of NOMA.
B. UAV Assisted Security
UAVs have been widely used for a variety of applications
including civilian and military purposes. The research on
UAVs has increased by U.S military investment since 2012
largely. It includes armed attacks, surveillance, reconnaissance
and transportation. UAVs are autonomous, automated, reliable
and remote devices. Due to the ability of data storage, UAVs
may store secret information or any type of useful data
depending on the type of application of UAVs. Therefore,
they are highly vulnerable to several attacks. For the purpose
of their security, it is required to investigate suitable security
measures. Recently, UAVs security became one of the major
research concern due to the amount of information they carry
in the airborne. Due to air-to-ground Line Of Sight (LOS)
transmission, it brings a great challenge for network security.
Fig. 20 shows the security challenges with some of the related
solutions for UAV PLS.
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Fig. 20. Security challenges, detection and solutions for UAV PLS.
Several key UAV security techniques were proposed, which
were depending on Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and
response mechanism. In [239], authors have explored the latest
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attacks and developed a system for threat assessment of UAVs
centered on the condition of services and communication
infrastructures. The authors considered the communication
system, sensor systems, fault handling mechanism, storage
media and other exposed factors. For the security analysis,
authors have used AR Drone, MQ-9Reaper, and RQ-170
Sentinel. In [240], authors have proposed an IDS based on
the adaptive specification. IDS detects any malicious attack
on UAVs for the importance of continuous operation of an
airborne system. On the other hand authors in [241], have pro-
posed a hierarchical intrusion detection and response scheme.
The proposed scheme works not only at the ground level
stations, but at the UAVs as well. The detection scheme also
used to characterize the type of attack. The proposed scheme
targets specially the lethal cyber-attacks like GPS spoofing,
false information dissemination, black hole, gray hole and
jamming attacks.
In [242], authors proposed PASER for low-altitude UAVs
combined with WLAN mesh networks (WMNs). PASER
fulfills the security requirement of a UAV-WMN. The pro-
posed protocol detects more attacks than IEEE 802.11s/i and
Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN). In
[241], [243], have addressed two main issues in the context
of attacker ejection and intrusion detection; attacker ejection
and activation of the intrusion monitoring process.
The optimization of secrecy rate is one of the active research
areas. Many authors proposed various technologies to achieve
maximized the security rate. For transmitting confidential
information from UAV to multiple ground users, authors in
[244] proposed an iterative algorithm to facilitate the opti-
mization problem. In [245], authors have proposed an iterative
suboptimal algorithm to solve the problem of maximizing the
average worst-case secrecy rate by mutually optimizing the
trajectory and the transmit power of UAVs ground communi-
cation system with multiple imperfectly located eavesdroppers.
Authors of [246] have discussed Secrecy Energy Efficiency
Maximization (SEEM) problem for UAVs trajectory planning.
An efficient iterative algorithm based on SCP and Dinkelbacks
method is used to obtain the solution of the problem under
discussion. In [247], authors formulated a Prospect Theory
(PT)-based smart attack game to resist the smart attack for
the UAV transmit power allocator on multiple radio channel.
In the observed scenario, deprived of having the information of
attack detection precision of UAV, an intruder chooses the kind
of attack from eavesdropping, jamming and spoofing. Authors
have proposed different power allocation strategies for tackling
the unknown attack by the intruder.
To secure UAVs, many researchers provided different cryp-
tographic scheme to authenticate the system. In [248], authors
have proposed an enhanced Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) cryptographic scheme called Mutual Authentication
DAA (MA-DAA) for Network Connected-UAV (NC-UAV)
units without human intervention. The enhancement of cryp-
tographic scheme DAA is required due to its capability of
limited transmission bandwidth and low computing in UAV.
The proposed scheme provides a low computational cost, high
efficiency and improved mutual authentication. Considering
no prior knowledge of the attacker, authors of [249], have
proposed an generalized log-likely hood ratio (GLLR) based
authentication scheme to encounter the spoofing attack of the
control signal in a UAV system. In [250], author provided
a biometric system of encryption between computerized BSs
and UAVs using Electroencephalogram (EEG) beta component
signal from users’ device. A proper jamming of signals for
eavesdroppers also guarantees the security of the network. In
[251], authors have proposed caching assisted UAV for secure
transmission in hyper-dense networks. In the proposed study,
Idle SBSs replaced by the UAVs which generates jamming
signals for the eavesdropper to provide secure transmission.
Authors in [244], dedicated some of the UAVs for signal
jamming wiretap channels only. Authors of [252], analyzed
3D UAV-enable mmWave with the consideration of real-world
constraints of UAV and exclusive features of air-to-ground
channel. Authors used part of UAVs to transmit jamming
signals to intruders for a better characterization of security.
C. mmWave
There are three promising technologies for 5G era com-
munication including mmWave, massive MIMO and HetNet.
These are some of the technologies among robust and efficient
wireless transmission proposed techniques [53]. To fulfill the
high capacity network requirements in 5G communication
networks, high demand for spectrum is intended to accomplish
by utilizing the mmWave band of the spectrum. The unli-
censed gigahertz bandwidth of the spectrum bestows mmWave
communication with great potential to offer optimum data
rate due to expected abundance of bandwidth. Fig. 21 shows
the security challenges in mmWave PLS with the range of
mmWave spectrum.
Fig. 21. Security challenges and communication of mmWave in PLS.
For mmWave security, most of the authors have combined
mmWave with MIMO to provide secured transmission and
included the behavior of AN to observe the network security
performance. Authors of [253], targeted to provide high net-
work security by designing secrecy beamforming MIMO AF
two-way cooperative network through mmWave. For vehicular
MIMO mmWave communication security, authors of [254],
proposed two techniques of PLS. In the first technique, authors
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have used a single Radio Frequency (RF) chain for transmit-
ting information signals to the intended receiver and noise
resembling signals in the direction other than the receiver. In
the second scheme for transmitting radio signal to the target
receiver and inject AN in the controlled direction with a few
RF chains.
To improve PLS in mmWave wireless communication sys-
tem, authors of [255], have proposed hybrid MIMO phased-
array time-modulated Directional Modulation (DM) scheme.
Similarly, with partial channel knowledge in MISO mmWave
systems authors of [256] proposed a hybrid analog-digital
procoder design. In [257], authors have characterized the
secrecy performance for AN aided and noise limited mmWave
network. For mmWave networks, Authors concluded two
significant parameters for the enhancement of system secrecy
i.e.; eavesdroppers intensity and array pattern.
For PLS security in mmWave large-scale antenna systems,
authors of [258], have designed hybrid precoders with two
types of channel knowledge. Authors have proposed an it-
erative hybrid precoder design to exploit the secrecy rate
and to minimize the secrecy outage probability. For multiple
transmitting antennas, large-scale mmWave ad hoc networks,
authors of [259] have proposed to assess an average achievable
secrecy rate for the exceptional situation of Uniform Linear
Array (ULA). Along with the proposed technique authors
have characterized impact of mmWave channel characteristics,
antenna gain, random blockages, and impact of AN in these
networks. Authors of [259] concluded the requirements of low
transmit power with low mmWave frequency and with high
transmit power for better secrecy performance of the network.
Additionally in [260], the authors aimed to improve the
system security by developing the mathematical framework
to analyze the secrecy outage probability, connection outage
probability, and achievable secrecy rate in hybrid mmWave-
overlaid microwave cellular networks. A conventional fading
model cannot precisely model the arbitrary fluctuations of
mmWave signals. Therefore, the Fluctuating Two-Ray (FTR)
fading model has proposed by the authors of [261] to provide
PLS in mmWave communication system. Authors have derived
the analytical expressions for the probability of strictly positive
secrecy capacity, average secrecy capacity and the secrecy
outage probability.
MIMO is a very useful technique in various applications
of wireless communication, due to the flexibility, secure and
better coverage. MIMO can be considered as an integrated
combined technique with NOMA, OFDMA, mmWave and
UAV in terms of security. A number of researchers obtained
multiple solutions for MIMO network by using beamforming,
AN, secrecy outage capacity, cooperative relay networks,
channel estimation and others. Fig. 22 shows the general
overview of the security challenges and solutions for massive
MIMO.
D. Massive MIMO
Beamforming is one of the special characteristics in MIMO
networks. Authors utilized it to provide better secrecy per-
formance. In the beam domain of single-cell secure massive
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Fig. 22. Security challenges and solutions for massive MIMO PLS.
MIMO network, authors of [262] have developed an effective
iterative and convergent algorithm for optimization of secrecy
sum rate and power allocation with a multiple antenna passive
eavesdropper. With known statistical Channel State Informa-
tion (CSI) at the BS, authors of [262] introduced a lower
bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy sum rate and derived
the condition for eigenvectors of the optimal input covariance
matrices to maximize the lower bound secrecy sum rate.
In [221], [263], authors studied the secure TDD massive
MIMO for physical layer and showed that the massive MIMO
communication is logically resilient towards no training-
phase jamming attacks. Authors of [221] have proposed a δ-
conjugate beamforming for establishing an information theo-
retic security for a certain number of antennas. Authors also
observed the system under training phase jamming showed
zero maximum secure Degrees of freedom (DoF) attained and
emphasized the importance of cryptography.
Usually, the purpose of AN is to confuse eavesdroppers in
a system. Improvement of secrecy capacity is a main concern
with AN schemes. In most of the AN schemes, a number of
transmitting antennas are assumed to be higher than receiving
antennas to utilize all eigen-subchannels in a MIMO system.
In [264], authors have proposed an AN scheme to improve
secrecy capacity in a MIMO system. In the proposed scheme,
authors used strongest eigen-subchannels to encode messages
based on Wishart matrices’ Eigen values.
In a non-regenerative MIMO two-way untrusted relay sys-
tem, authors of [265] have investigated a secure precoding
design and applied AN on the source and relay is assumed to
be untrusted. On the maximum secrecy sum rate, authors have
also provided an asymptotic analysis. For the PLS of a multi-
user Beam Division Multiple Access (BDMA) massive MIMO
system, authors of [266] designed robust AN beamforming
scheme with consideration of channel estimation errors.
Authors of [267], have proposed an effective adaptive
selecting transmission mode scheme that maximizes the sum
secrecy outage capacity. In the transmission of signals between
the source and multiple secure users in MIMO Rayleigh fading
channel, authors of [267] used harmful interuser interference
as a tool for anti-eavesdropping. In [222], authors proved the
guaranteed secrecy performance for MIMO HetNets in physi-
cal layer and derived upper bound secrecy outage expressions
for a HetNet user.
MISO relay cooperative scheme for a near and a far vehicle
has been studied in [131]. CJ protected zero techniques and an
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signal superposition has been adopted. Authors have proposed
a optimal secure transmission scheme after careful analysis for
eavesdropping security threats and two scenarios; i) optimized
SOP to minimize message leakage with considerable rate of
transmission. ii) improved averaged secrecy rate by providing
a power allocation scheme with keeping system throughput
into consideration.
For a finite memory Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel,
authors of [268] studied the secrecy capacity subjected to
per symbol power constraint. In [269], authors have proposed
Advantage Distillation (AD) scheme for secret key sharing in
MIMO wiretap channel using Generalized Extended Space-
Time Block Codes (GEO-STBCs) and the feedback bits
from the receiver. For the proposed scheme, authors have
constructed Two-Way MIMO Wiretap With Feedback (TW-
MIMO-WTF) channel.
Various authors used power allocation schemes to provide
network security. In [270], authors have proposed a Joint Relay
Selection and Power Allocation (JRP) scheme for improving
the PLS of the network with untrusted two-way relay coopera-
tive communication and passive eavesdroppers (non-colliding
and colliding) with multiple antennas at the source and single
destination antenna. In the proposed scenario, destination is
implemented the CJ. For a secure communication, authors
of [271] used an iterative algorithm to propose an iterative
distributed total Mean Squared Error (MSE) minimization
algorithm (MT-MSE). In [272], authors have investigated a
power-ratio-based active pilot attack detection scheme in the
underlay spectrum sharing multi-user mMIMO systems with
active eavesdroppers and derived the probability of detection
and MMSE channel estimation.
For a spatial Modulation (SM) MIMO system physical
layer encryption, authors of [273] have proposed an encryp-
tion scheme called Chaotic Antenna-Index Three-Dimensional
Modulation and Constellation Points Rotated (CATMCPR).
The proposed scheme is based on spatial modulation and
chaotic theory. The proposed technique overcomes the draw-
backs including degradation of spectral efficiency perfor-
mance, necessity of pre-shared key, excess jamming power,
and requirement of prior CSI.
E. Channel Coding for PHY Layer Security
Channel codes are typically designed to make communi-
cations reliable by adding redundancy into transmitted data
that allow for error detection and correction at the receiver.
Channel coding is also typically the last encoding rule prior
to transmission, thus preventing the propagation of errors at
the decoder. A multilayer security solution for digital commu-
nication systems is provided by considering the joint effects
of physical-layer security channel codes with application layer
cryptography. Low Density Parity Check Codes (LDPC) and
Polar codes are the candidate channel coding techniques
proposed for 5G.
Some ciphers can be very strong when the code design guar-
anteed an insignificant error rate. In [274], authors exploited a
point of failure in message passing decoding called stopping
sets, for security. In [212], an AN-aided polar coded algorithm
has been proposed to improve the secrecy requirement of the
already existing polar coding algorithm as per requirements of
upcoming 5G technology. The proposed technique is based on
two steps. Initially, in the codeword of current transmission,
AN noise from the previous transmission’s code block con-
fidentiality bits have been added. Hence, it can be removed
by legitimate user only. The length of AN is shorter than the
exact codeword, which deteriorates eavesdropper’s receiving
capability by optimized jamming position selection.
F. Secure RF Energy Harvesting
With the rapidly growing number of connected devices,
the demand for energy is also rising exponentially. This
results in upraising interest for QoS guaranteed energy-aware
communication techniques to minimize the consumption of
fossil fuel [275]. This reflects directly on the revenue of the
mobile operators and other service providers as well. As there
is no free-lunch this also comes with greater challengers such
as secure transmission of data. RF Energy Harvesting (EH)
techniques such as Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) and Simul-
taneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT) are
received significant attention as sustainable techniques for EH
[276]– [277].
The secret communication is conceivable when the eaves-
dropper channel is a worst than that of the destination channel.
CJ aided secure communication for SWIPT networks was
investigated in [278]. Here the jamming signal is used to
reduce the eavesdroppers channel quality. Thus it helps the
source to escalate the EH by the energy receiver. In [279]
studied relative secrecy analysis of the separated and inte-
grated receiver [280] architectures under imperfect channel
estimation with SWIPT. This work emphases on the evaluation
of secrecy performance of a SWIPT system with the com-
binations of receiver architectures at the legitimate receiver
and eavesdroppers. Then, in [281], authors proposed a multi-
antenna energy-constrained cooperative relay network in the
context of physical layer security using SWIPT. A new SWIPT
protocol referred as harvest-and-jam was proposed in [277] to
maximize the secretary rate for a self-sustainable mobile BS
setup.
G. Other Physical Layer Issues Related to 5G
To address the PLS in mmWave network authors of [282]
have proposed a beamforming approach called Frequency
Diverse Array (FDA). The proposed scheme introduces a
frequency offsets across antenna array to decouple the high
correlated channels of users and eavesdroppers. In [283],
authors proposed a multiple inter-symbol obfuscation scheme,
which depends on AN symbols. This scheme protects the
transmission from the passive eavesdropping and package
injection attacks.
Authors of [284], proposed an Opportunistic Relay Selec-
tion (ORS) scheme to provide high Security-Reliability Trade-
offs (SRT) in the presence of eavesdroppers. Authors of [285]
have proposed a user cooperation scheme based on Weighted
Fractional Fourier Transform (WFRFT). In the proposed tech-
nique, cooperators information signals can introduce AN effect
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on eavesdroppers. Authors modeled a cooperation problem
as a coalitional game for WFRFT-based PHY-layer security
with non-transferable utility. Authors of [286], claimed to
improve the Primary Users (PU) security with the help of
Secondary Users (SU) transmission interference in a cognitive
radio (CR) network. In traditional schemes, SU is harmful
for PU. In the proposed scheme, authors shared the spectrum
between SU and PU; however, primary user can demand the
high spectrum to achieve high secrecy capacity. In [287],
authors have proposed a game-theoretic framework called
Multi-hop Topology Formation Game (MTFG) to provide joint
optimization of PLS with end-to-end delay management in
the Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs). In the proposed
framework, along with fulfilling the E2E delay requirement
body-worn sensor devices communicate in the presence of
fading and wiretap channel condition in order to find the safest
multi-path hop to the destination.
In [213], three strategies i.e. Global-Defense Cooperative
Anti-Eavesdropping Strategy (GD-CAES), Max-Min Cooper-
ative Anti Eavesdropping Strategy (MM-CAES) and Delay-
Aware Cooperative Anti-Eavesdropping Strategy (DA-CAES)
were proposed based on the graph/secrecy Shortest Path Al-
gorithm (SPA) technique. They are less complex than Hard-
working path selection (HW-PS). The proposed techniques are
subjected to three different scenarios including the coopera-
tion among eavesdroppers with MRC of wiretapped signals,
independent eavesdroppers with and without MRC. For less
complexity of the system, greedy algorithm has been selected
for an optimization problem solution.
VI. SECURITY MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT
This section presents the most important challenges related
to security monitoring and management in 5G networks.
Network monitoring is an important network management
aspect in telecommunication networks including 5G networks.
These monitoring systems collect various information includ-
ing network statistics, traffic patterns, application status and
user profiles. In addition, these systems can collect the flow
samples at various intervals and granularities. This information
is useful to evaluate the status of the network as well as to per-
form various security and network management tasks such as
anomaly detection, network forensics analysis, load balancing,
traffic engineering, enforcing Service Level Agreements (SLA)
and maintain QoS. Moreover, network monitoring is used
for detection and prevention of security breaches, that will
ultimately enhance the overall network performance [288].
Future 5G networks will connect huge number of devices
(e.g., mobile phones, laptop and tablet computers, IoT de-
vices, robots, drones, and automated vehicles) and it will
exponentially increase the workload on security monitoring
systems [289]. In addition, 5G has promised to offer enhanced
consumers experience with powerful network performance and
seamless experiences across many verticals. This requires the
5G monitoring systems to update by several challenges, such
as monitoring E2E performance across complex architectures,
delivering dashboards, reports, and alerts with speed at scale
and ensuring multi-disciplinary 5G customers are satisfied
with speed, performance, and their overall mobile experience.
However, the monitoring systems are incapable of handing
this demand due to complex, distributed and uncoordinated
system management, high provisioning and operational costs,
lack of support for automation, hardware dependency and
vendor-specific monitoring. Existing 4G monitoring systems
do not have a centralized controller. Different monitoring
systems have implemented at the different segments of the net-
works, e.g Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) at the eNodeBs, Se-
curity Information and Event Management (SIEM) at Evolved
Packet Core (EPC). As the results, the network monitoring gets
complicated. Current monitoring systems are heavy dependent
on physical hardware. Furthermore, most of the monitoring
mechanism are operating on the vendor proprietary hardware
[290], [291]. Therefore, it is impossible for mobile network
operator to upgrade or modify these mechanisms without the
consent of the vendor. Due to the high dynamicity in 5G
networks, this is one of the critical concerns for MNOs.
Moreover, existing monitoring techniques in mobile networks
are over-provisioned to work even at the peak hour traffic
loads. Thus, most of the available resources are under utilized
for a long period [290], [291].
Therefore, 5G needs more dynamic and scalable monitoring
systems than current systems. In addition, 5G consists of both
physical and virtual resources. Existing monitoring systems do
not capable of monitoring such virtualized devices. Thus, there
is a definite need to design new monitoring systems, which
can monitor virtualized elements as well [292], [293]. On one
hand, 5G network monitoring mechanisms should be able to
satisfay the requirements introduced by the virtualization. On
the other hand, they should be able to obtain benefits from the
flexibility offered by SDN and NFV [291].
In SDN based 5G networks, the centralized control is
allowing to create monitoring apps that can take decisions
based on a network-wide holistic view. In such systems,
the centralized event correlation is possible at the network
controller. This allows design new ways and algorithms to
mitigate network faults efficiently [291]. Similarly, NFV can
be used to virtualize the existing monitoring solutions such
as SIEM, IDS, IPS (Intruder Prevention Systems), DPI [294].
Moreover, NFV can improve the scalability of 5G monitoring
applications by dynamically scaling increasing the monitoring
resources according to the traffic demand. However, the impact
of virtualization technologies has to be assessed. For instance,
virtualization creates boundaries that could be breached by
exploiting vulnerabilities and bugs in the virtualization code
(e.g., hypervisors). Furthermore, the entire 5G systems actually
become files store in some place that can easily be stolen or
replaced [295].
Various architectural options were proposed for 5G monitor-
ing systems. Fig. 23 and 24 illustrates the 5G software Defined
Monitoring (SDM) architecture which was proposed based on
SDN and NFV technologies [290], [291], [294], [295].
In [290], [291] authors as proposed a SDM architecture,
which can be used in NFV enabled softwarized networks
including 5G. Moreover, network monitoring frameworks for
NFV are proposed in [294]–[297]. These architectures pro-
posed to deploy both virtual and physical sensors in the
different segment of the network. The network monitoring
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Fig. 23. 5G software Defined Monitoring (SDM) architecture mapping with
NFV [290], [291], [294], [295].
Fig. 24. 5G software Defined Monitoring (SDM) architecture mapping with
SDN [290], [291].
management entity is mainly responsible for the management
of network-wide network monitoring. Monitoring probe man-
ager is responsible for the deployment of both virtual and
physical probes across the network. Moreover, the existing
NFV and SDN interfaces will be modified to enable new SDM
Control Interfaces. This new interface uses to transport the
packet flow data and meta-data needed by network monitoring
applications and Network Services modules. This data will
be transported from either the switches or the probes (i.e.,
agents) to SDM controller. By introducing SDN-driven SDM,
SDN-enabled switches, COTS packet processing and security
appliances can act as packet brokers [298].
Table X presents the limitations in legacy monitoring tech-
niques and the possible solutions proposed by SDM.
In [301], authors proposed an 5G-oriented automatic mon-
itoring management architecture. This architecture integrates
both SDN and NFV concepts to monitor and orchestrate the
whole life-cycle of monitoring services in 5G networks by
considering control plane information. A novel IoT based
TABLE X
LEGACY MONITORING TECHNIQUES VS SOFTWARE DEFINED
MONITORING [290], [291], [294], [295], [299], [300]
Limitation in Legacy
Monitoring Techniques
How SDM Can solve it
Difficult to deploy and
maintain
Simplifies network management and main-
tenance via network automation
Distributed infrastructure Centralized control of monitoring functions
via monitoring controller
Difficult to automate mit-
igation actions
The network softwarization enable the abil-
ity to automates mitigation actions.
Independent resources Virtualization enable the sharing of re-
sources between different services in the
network
Under unitized resources The sharing of resources between different
services is offering the opportunity to opti-
mize the utilization of network resources
Redundant Monitoring The centralized coordination can eliminate
the redundant monitoring in the network
Vendor dependent moni-
toring equipment
Open network standards eliminate the re-
quirement to use vendor specific equipment
High CAPEX Vendor independent equipment, optimiza-
tion and sharing of resources reduce the
CAPEX
High OPEX Automation of network monitoring, opti-
mization and sharing of resources reduce the
OPEX
network monitoring framework for 5G mobile network was
proposed in [302]. The proposed framework simplifies the
implementation of the monitoring system for 5G network
operators.
Moreover, some of the other technologies such as ma-
chine learning are used for SDM architecture. In [303]–[308],
authors proposed to used machine learning algorithms for
anomaly detection in vitalized networks. Proposed solutions
can achieve high precision and low false alarm rate than
tradition approaches. A survey on SDN based network in-
trusion detection system using machine learning approaches
is presented in [309]. An efficient deep learning model for
intrusion classification and prediction for 5G and IoT networks
was proposed in [310]. Authors evaluated their model by
using the benchmark Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion data-set and the
proposed scheme had 99.9% overall detection accuracy of for
Flooding, Impersonation and Injection type of attacks. A novel
DDOS attack detection scheme for 5G was proposed in [311].
Here, the traffic flows are inspected at source-side looking for
discordant behaviors.
On the other hand, there are new challenges such extensible
and programmable instrumentation, measurement data analy-
sis, visualization and middle ware security features which are
rated to softwarized network monitoring systems. In [312],
authors discuss such research challenges related to the perfor-
mance measurement and monitoring of the future virtual net-
work. In [288], [290], [291], authors highlighted the challenges
such as compatibility with traditional monitoring systems,
complex monitoring applications, scalability and performance
challenges, placement of the monitoring controller, adapting
traditional monitoring techniques to SDN and information
extraction related to SDM. In [288], authors surveys the tasks
and challenges associated with network Monitoring in SDN
which are also quite relevant to 5G networks.
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VII. PRIVACY IN 5G NETWORK
5G networks promise to serve the end users with smart ser-
vices which will raise many privacy issues from the viewpoint
of users. The services offered in 5G network will contain
primary information (such as identity, location or position,
and private data) about its users. How this information will
be stored and in what conditions individual data can be
available by many stakeholders, therefore, 5G networks evoke
significant issues on private-data leakage. In this section,
firstly, we focus on privacy categories from the view point of
the users , secondly privacy issues in 5G network, and finally
privacy goals under the 5G network architecture.
A. Privacy Categories From the Users Perspective
This subsection discusses three different privacy categories
i.e. data privacy, location privacy and identity privacy [313],
as follows.
• Data privacy: 5G networks allows users to use smart and
data-intensive on-demand services (e.g., high-resolution
streaming, healthcare [314], smart metering [315].)
through the heterogeneous smart devices. To provide
these services, service providers may store and use private
data of individuals without their permission. The stored
data may be shared with other stakeholders so that they
can analyze the data using Machine Learning Techniques
(MLTs) and find new business trends for their own
product, which could be more suitable for that user. For
instance, recent studies pointed out that a smart meter
consumption data may reveal personal information, e.g.,
a house is empty or economic status. To mitigate such
data privacy issues, service providers must provide the
clarification for the users that for how and where the
individual’s data have been stored. In addition, how and
what purpose their data have been used.
• Location privacy: In 5G network, most devices will rely
on ubiquitous Location-Based Services (LBSs) [316]. A
LBS uses location data, which is related to the smart-
phone and/or mobile device to deliver services to the
users. Recently, the promotion of LBS has significantly
increased in several verticals, for instance, government,
entertainment, transportation, healthcare, food delivery
and others. Indeed, such LBSs make users life easier and
more enjoyable but bring plethora of privacy issues that of
being continuously tracked. In some cases, the individuals
may be unaware of the potential risks graveled by these
technologies and the implications of how their location
is being determined, and who is being permitted access
to that information. More importantly, recently, digital
media reported telecomm companies are revealing the
exact location/position of their users to several stakehold-
ers without the users consents. As a consequence, LBSs
could case potential risks to users privacy.
• Identity privacy: It means the protection of identity-
related information of a device/system/user against active
attacks. As more and more devices are being connected
to the Internet, it raises alarming conditions of identity
theft [317]. For instance, in recent research, the authors
have pointed out that the active attacker can expose the
identity of a subscriber by catching the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of the subscribers UE
[24]. Moreover, the more details can be found about a
user through the identity theft. Identity theft can therefore
be counted as one of the biggest risks in the 5G and
IoT. Thus, it is paramount to design secure and efficient
identity management mechanisms for the identity privacy
in 5G network.
B. Privacy Issues in 5G Networks
The 5G networks are going to be very vast networks
including several stakeholders, new technologies, verticals,
businesses, regulations, and end-users. Covering privacy issues
for each stakeholder is a complex task because multiple
interests are at stake. However, few of privacy issues are
pointed out below from the cloud computing point of view.
This is due to the fact that cloud computing concepts are
relevant to many of 5G network technologies, such as SDN,
NFV [313].
• End-to-End data privacy: 5G networks support several
stakeholders such as operators, service providers, verti-
cals, enterprises, and new technologies in conjunction
with new business models. Most of these stakeholders
make use of cloud computing to store, use and process
personal information from the consumers. The personal
data of the consumers will be processed and shared
by different stakeholders their own purposes, thus this
become a source of privacy breaches. Therefore, in 5G
networks must consider an end-to-end data confidentiality
approach to protect the consumers privacy [25] [10].
• Shared environment and loss of personal data own-
ership issues: The 5G network would provide shared
network infrastructure or virtual networks to run multiple
applications controls, such as healthcare and smart grid.
Such shared network infrastructures may pose unau-
thorized data access and exchange as shown in [318].
Therefore, effective solutions are needed that can of-
fer shared network infrastructure functionalities without
compromising the privacy of the users. Moreover, in a
shared network infrastructure, assume if the personal data
losses then who will own the responsibility, which is a big
concern among the users. Therefore, the ownership or li-
censing of personal information must be assigned/defined
between the stakeholders such as mobile network opera-
tor, service providers and third-parties.
• Different trust objectives issues: In a typical 5G
network, mobile operators and communication service
providers may collaborate and migrate a portion of their
network to cloud. In such circumstance, these stakehold-
ers may have distinct trust objectives/priorities as per
their own policies and/or regulations [313]. Hence, they
might not necessarily consider all aspects of privacy of
the consumers data.
• Issues in trans-border information flows: Due to the
global digitalization, personal data is a lifeblood of the
modern market and it will freely flow across the borders.
JOURNAL OF LATEX IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS, JULY 2019 33
As data freely flows, it is highly paramount to mandate
individual or government consent for the data transfers
including how information is being processed and stored
across the border [313] [319].
• Third party issues in 5G network: 5G with IoT brings
a new frontier for the application developers to design
more interactive applications for the several vertical ap-
plications those utilize several communication protocols.
As the application designers are typically granted per-
missions to access the 5G network, he/she may disclose
or sell individual’s private data to other entities. For
instance, as shown in [320] – ”the health insurance
portability and accountability act (HIPPA) allows a share-
out of individual’s health data” by using mobile apps.
Moreover, the information sharing rule in a cloud network
can significantly invoke data-privacy issues.
C. Regulatory Objectives in Privacy Protections
Regulatory objectives are paramount to achieve privacy in
the 5G domains. As the 5G networks research is at early stage,
not many direct objectives are defined by the regulation bodies.
However, few generic regulatory objectives from the cloud
computing [313] can be extended to 5G networks, as follows.
• Single market promotion and balance the interests
globally: Single market promotion refers to all the rele-
vant regulatory objectives or legislative practices should
be promoted to strength and enable privacy policies glob-
ally without any internal borders and regulatory obstacles.
In addition, the privacy regulations should balance the
interest of different stakeholders including the consumers
in order to realize the benefits of 5G technologies and its
applications.
• Promote data portability: The principle to data porta-
bility allows the individuals/businesses to shift their per-
sonal information from one service provider to another
service provider, and from one country to another coun-
try without employing mandated standards [321] [322].
Therefore, it is highly needed to promote data portability
in 5G networks.
• Define global market privacy regulations: In the con-
text of a global market, new data privacy regulations are
required to ensure interoperability and compatibility with
the 5G based technology. Globally, different regulation
bodies must collaborate and cooperate to each other, and
develop requirements for the new privacy regulations. For
example, the EU-US Privacy Shield, enforces responsibil-
ities on the US companies to keep secure private-data of
the EU citizens [323].
• Promote data accountability and responsibility: As the
several players will involve in the 5G network, the data
accountability and responsibility are highly required. The
accountability act involves different stakeholders to take
obligations for how and when they will use individual’s
private data and what rules will be followed when the
data is accessible to other stakeholders [313]. Therefore,
all the stakeholders must have significant and appropriate
measures in place that can prove accountability and
responsibility for the personal data.
Table XI shows the impact and relevance of regulatory objec-
tives with privacy issues.
TABLE XI
IMPACT AND RELEVANCE OF REGULATORY OBJECTIVES WITH PRIVACY
ISSUES [313]
Single
market
promotion
Data
portability
Global
market
regula-
tions
Data
account-
ability
End-to-end data
privacy
× × × ×
Shared environ-
ment issue
× × ×
Trust objectives
issues
× × ×
Trans-border in-
formation flow
× ×
Third party is-
sues
× ×
D. Privacy Mechanisms
Following the new EU General Data Privacy Regulation
(GDPR), individual privacy is an important issue for all
the stakeholders those are gathering and using individual’s
personal s data [324]. Therefore, it is paramount to use
efficient algorithms, schemes, and protocols that will protect
as much as possible user information. From the perspective
of 5G networks, many of distributed applications and devices
(e.g., healthcare, smart grid, mobile, IoT devices, sensors and
actuator) exchange messages across their network via com-
munication technologies and protocols. Such applications and
devices significantly expand a huge number of messages (e.g.,
high-resolution streaming, smart metering, and so on) over the
Internet. However, the main question is how these messages
will be collected, stored and used without disclosing the
private-data of individuals. Moreover, key privacy properties
can be used in 5G network, as follows.
• Anonymity: In this property, an object is not capable
of being identified among its peers (i.e., in anonymity
set) [325]. An end-to-end anonymity aims the identity of
an entity is being hidden from others, even in a same
anonymity set.
• Unlinkability: In unlinkability, the individual’s informa-
tion is usually unlinkable between two or more users
in a system. In the evolving 5G network, unlinkability
is highly important and it can be enforced at various
domains in the 5G networks, such as SDN, VPN, rout-
ing, and back-end servers (i.e., data aggregators, cloud
servers).
• Undetectability: In 5G network, several objects (such
as, machines, applications, users.) will communicate and
exchange information between each others. However, an
attacker may have an interest to detect the communicating
entities by eavesdropping on information/data exchanged
[326]. Therefore, in 5G network the information and/or
objects must be undetectable to the attacker.
• Unobservability: In this property, an attacker may not
be able to observe whether two or more entities are
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Fig. 25. 5G standardization security forces and their role.
participating in the communication [325]. In other words,
if an entity had sent a message over the communication
then an adversary (i.e., active or passive) should not be
able to observe the targeted entity, such as sending mobile
healthcare data to the physician.
• Pseudonymity: A pseudonym is an instance of an object
that is unlike than the objects real names. In the 5G
networks, typically several stakeholders will be involved.
As these stakeholders can access the personal informa-
tion, a smart object must have several instances (i.e.,
pseudonmity). These instances are only be known by the
involved entities those are exchanging information with
the smart objects.
VIII. 5G SECURITY STANDARDIZATION
With the advent of 5G, standards are particularly paramount
globally. Typically, a standard is a key for the convergence
of telecommunication and IT sector to develop a ubiquitous
infrastructure. Such ubiquitous infrastructure will offer global
services to customers and create new opportunities to intercon-
nect a wide range of smart objects. To ensure the 5G promises,
all security events or issues going with the 5G architecture
need to be handled in a standardization way. However, as the
5G is under development, the security standards for the 5G
networks are still the drafting phase.
Globally, there have been a big number of standardization
bodies those are contributing immensely defining security
requirements. Nevertheless, these bodies provide security rec-
ommendations and specifications in 5G network, as shown
in the Fig. 25. Moreover, these standardization organizations
are working on security issues and solutions in 5G network.
In addition, few of the groups are also accountable for the
economic regulation of the telecommunications sectors, and
supervising technical interoperability and safety of the 5G
networks in their respective countries. In addition, a number
of local governing bodies are trying to regulate the security
mechanisms in a certain local area.
In release 15 [230], 3GPP defines a security framework,
architecture and possible operations for the 5G systems. Partic-
ularly, the security architecture has been proposed for different
domains in the 5G networks, e.g., security at the network
level, security for end-users, security for the applications. The
architecture introduces of several security entities, such as
AUSF, Authentication Credential Repository and Processing
function (ARPF) and Security Anchor Function (SAF). In
addition, the document defines general security requirements,
e.g., key management, authentication and access control, data
confidentiality and integrity, and privacy for the subscribers.
For details, the reader may refer to [230].
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), collects in-
put from many local organizations and defines high quality
technical recommendations that are easy to implement in the
5G networks [327]. However, the study group 17 (SG17)
is mainly responsible for designing and developing security
in the use of ICT. In order to better understand 5G threat
landscape and security requirements, the SG17 is closely
collaborating with the 5G manufacturers, telecommunication
operators, regulators, and application providers [328]. The
security group is not only focusing the traditional threats
but also considering the possible threats from the quantum
computers, which are yet to happened. However, few of the
security requirements (e.g., access control, authentication and
encryption) have been considered for the SDN, NFV, and
network slicing.
5G is set to be a faster broadband that is connected with
Internet and Intranet protocols, therefore, the IETF is expected
to play a key role. Note: the IETF has not commenced new
contributions to major items that can be specifically labeled
for the 5G network. However, many of existing Request For
Comments (RFC), such as IP Wireless Access to Vehicular
Environments (IPWAVE) WG [329] and Host Identity Protocol
(HIP) [330] can be directly used in the 5G networks. The
Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) WG is
working on authenticated authorization protocols for gaining
resources hosted on servers in low-powered environments
[331]. In addition, recently, Kumar-verma suggested an IETF
draft ”Security for 5G”. The authors proposed a new technique
that can mitigate several issues of attack over the mobile
communication system [332]. The draft proposed to use a
public key cryptosystem to encrypt the mobile communication
traffic. However, in order to realization security in the 5G
network, such drafts are at early stage.
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
has identified technical specifications, e.g., ABE as a key
enabler technology for distributed systems in 5G networks.
ETSI technical commission of cyber security has issued two
access control specifications (i.e., ETSI TS 103 458 [333]
and ETSI TS 103 532 [334]) for 5G networks. ETSI TS 103
458 focuses on how to secure user identity, and preventing
disclosure to an unauthorized entity in a WLAN and cloud.
Whereas ETSI TS 103 532 describes trust models protocols
using ABE mechanism and increases data security and privacy
in untrusted environments. In 2016, ETSI specifies the security
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and trust guideline for the network function virtualization
(NFV) security [335]. NFV security-group has highlighted the
need for trustworthy models that can maintain trust within
VNFs and between VNFs. In 2014, the ETSI MEC ISG
(Industry Specification Group) was organized for aiming of
standardizing the MEC environment. In addition, the working
group has also been responsible for determining different pos-
sible service use-cases, and for defining technical requirements
for MEC.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-
P1912 provides specifications for privacy and security archi-
tecture for the end user wireless devices [336]. The specifica-
tions are issued for the Home Area Network (HAN), Wireless
Area Network (WAN), and Wireless Personal Area Network
(WPAN). The architecture mainly focuses on simplification of
user authentication. Other standards in IEEE include 802.11,
where a secure interoperability and mobility are provided
with the outer world. In the 5G network, many of security
standard can be adopted from other groups, for instance
oneM2M (Machine To Machine). The security architecture
in oneM2M consists of several layers: (i) security functions
layer, (ii) security environment abstraction layer, and (iii)
secure environment layer [337]. The main security attributes
in oneM2M are authentication, authorization, and identity
management.
The 5G PPP security working group was established in early
April 2016 and led by 5G-ENSURE [338]. The heterogeneous
nature of the 5G infrastructure, may result in unauthorized and
opportunistic access or usage of assets. The group therefore
identified many security-related risks including 5G Identity
thefts or cloning, unauthorized access of 5G connected devices
critical data. In addition, new threats due to their seamless
inter-working as requested 5G. Following the risks, a new
security architecture for 5G has been suggested in [338].
There are various other suitable standardization bodies (such
as, Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and Open Networking
Foundation (ONF)), which are closely collaborating to the
5G networks. At TCG, the Mobile Platform Work Group
(MPWG) develops application scenarios, platform frameworks
and examines the security of 5G network [339]. The ONF
typically recommends to make use of SDN and network
operating systems in the applications and industrial verticals
[340]. The specifications of the ONF, including OpenFlow
tool, can be a mainstream tool for the 5G core architecture.
Consequently, these specifications and tools are imperative
from the security perspective in 5G networks.
Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN) 5G Secu-
rity Group – the NGMN Alliance typically refers a mobile
telecommunications association [341]. The alliance is com-
prised of many entities, such as mobile network operators, ser-
vice providers and device manufacturers. The security group
objective is to guide standardization and implementation of 5G
security features. The group produces 5G security related high-
level requirements and recommendations. Moreover, the group
concentrates on enhancing the communication infrastructures
via incorporating the LTE-advance networks that included
various platforms to advance mobile services in 5G. Moreover,
NGMN 5G security group has published a document on 5G
security, MEC, low latency, and consistent user experience
[342]. Basically, the document defines several service scenar-
ios and technical requirements for MEC in 5G.
National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST):
is playing an important role in the standardization efforts of
5G technologies, e.g., cloud computing (CC). The group is
known as NIST CC. The main agenda of the group is to design
and accelerate the secure cloud computing to the 5G network.
Through standard developments and guidelines, the NIST is
closely collaborating with the federal official, government and
standard bodies [343]. Moreover, the NIST CC group designed
and developed a high-level conceptual model and reference
architecture for cloud computing. This reference architecture
includes relevant requirements and other procedures of cloud
computing in the 5G networks.
In summary, the standards and specifications that will define
a mature and complete reference architecture for the 5G
network are yet to be finalized and outlined. It may take
many more years and involve several stakeholder entities
involving service operators, governments, regulators, man-
ufacturers, policy-makers and representatives of 5G users.
Nevertheless, enormous academic research and standardization
are still ongoing activities in the 5G networks.
IX. PROJECTS
This section presents some significant ongoing research
projects that are explicitly contributing to 5G Security efforts.
The presented projects along with their technical contributions
are summarized in the Table XII.
TABLE XII
CONTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL LEVEL ONGOING PROJECTS
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√ √ √ √ √ √ √
IoT
√ √ √ √ √ √
SDN
√ √ √ √
NFC
√ √ √ √ √
Network
Slicing
√ √ √ √ √
mmWave
√ √ √
NOMA
√ √
massive MIMO
√ √ √ √
D2D
√ √ √
UAVs
√ √
Full Duplex
√ √
OFDMA
√ √ √ √
A. European 5G PPP [5G Infrastructure, Public Private Part-
nership] (2013 - 2020)
This is a platform for public, a joint initiative between the
European Commission and European ICT industry. The 5G
PPP initiative was initiated based on the experience of ICT
infrastructure and communication networks. This consortium
will be empowering the global competitiveness of European
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industry. This created the platform for creating new opportuni-
ties for a new PPP action on networking infrastructures [344].
This offers funding and support for 5G related SMEs (Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises) and other related projects to
foster and realize the EU commission’s 5G vision.
Security challenges faced by the ICT industry and the
solutions for those challenges would be valuable for the future
PPP projects. Security solutions gained by the experience of
ICT industries are invaluable and provide opportunities for
the new entrants in the industries. Those new entrants could
be small start-up companies incubated from Universities and
other research institutes. New startup companies are vital for
PPP and they bring new ideas, most of the leading companies
like Skype and TransferWise are developed from the startups.
The security solution provided by the new entrants (start ups)
for the 5G infrastructure and communication networks can be
more specific based on the feedback from the peer industry.
Thus, the European 5G PPP would be an excellent and more
suitable platform for the collaboration between ICT industries,
Government and the new entrants. This partnership leads to the
capacity building of the EU in 5G and their future innovative
ideas will be resourceful.
B. 5G Ensure [Enablers for Network and System Security and
Resilience] (November 2015 - October 2017)
This initiative aligns with the 5G PPP and introduces a
road map for achieving 5G security targets at the European
scale. This action will define challenges in relation to 5G
security. This project introduces 5G basic architecture and
other main concerns along with security goals [345]. They also
focus on other trends such as network deperimeterization and
software defined networking and virtualization. The security
architecture builds on and expands on the 3GPP security
architecture.
C. National Science Foundation Programs Funded 5G Secu-
rity Projects
National Science Foundation (NSF) Programs of US fund
many ICT research projects and it has certain programs that
focused on cybersecurity [346]. Some of them are listed below:
1) Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC)
2) Information and Intelligent Systems (IIS)
3) Networking Technology and Systems (NeTS)
5G security plays an important role in the ICT industry
because 5G communication is going to be an integral part of
ICT. Thereby, many future research projects are specifically
focused on 5G communication and its infrastructure [347],
which are part of the 400 million USD initiative [346].
Funding for 5G security projects are approved by the NSF
under the categories SaTC, NeTS and IIS. SaTC program is
solely dedicated to support projects that strive for national
defense and ICT security. The programs like IIS and NeTS are
robust programs dedicated to technological advancement like
AI, automation etc. In cyberspace, which includes ICT and
its security aspects. For example, under the NeTS program,
funding is awarded for projects related to the IoT security as
in [348], likewise there are many other projects are supported
by NSF. These programs provide opportunities for the research
institutes and project principal investigators affiliated with the
USA based university.
D. STEAM [Secure and Trustworthy Framework for Inte-
grated Energy and Mobility] (September 2018 - August 2021)
Secure and Trustworthy Framework for Integrated Energy
and Mobility (STEAM) in Smart Connected Communities
[348]. STEAM is a collaborative project, which is funded
by the Japan-US Network Opportunity 2 (JUNO2) and NSF.
JUNO2 program is specifically focussed on research and
development of trustworthy networking for smart and con-
nected Communities. Under the collaboration, STEAM project
utilizes data from the Japan automotive sector and, also
access tested and other infrastructure from Japan. With this
realtime data and tested, STEAM will develop an innovative
algorithm that sloves the security and privacy issues of smart
meters, energy exchange and resource allocation for the ICT
related applications. Finally, they will design a modular, secure
and trustworthy middleware architecture that implements the
innovative algorithm on the ICT applications in the Japan
automotive sector.
E. ANASTACIA [Advanced Networked Agents for Security and
Trust Assessment in CPS / I0T Architectures] (January 2017
- December 2019)
The aim of this project is to develop a new paradigm with
new methodology and tools to increase security and privacy,
reliability in a dynamic and rapidly evolving environment
[344]. The research and development are focused on providing
a holistic solution that enables trust and security for Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS) and cloud architectures.
ANASTACIA will develop an adaptation trustworthy au-
tonomic security framework for an entire ICT Systems De-
velopment Lifecycle (SDL). The framework is adaptable in
the sense, that it allows diverse enablers in the ICT system
to dynamically organize and deploy user security preferences
and facilitates the deployment and enforces the security frame
in heterogeneous scenarios which includes the system based
on NFV, SDN and IoT networks. ANASTACIA will ultimately
facilitate the security analysis along with the solutions for the
positioned gears with simple and customer friendly security
policy tools.
F. 5G! Pagoda (July 2016 - June 2019)
The pagoda is a Japan and European collaborative project
that focus on developing scalable 5G slicing architecture,
that evolves from the current NFV architecture towards an
architecture that support of different specialized network slices
composed of multi-vendor virtualized network functions, and
considering interoperability within/among the network slices
as well as with legacy system-based services [349]. The archi-
tecture accommodates scalable, flexible and dynamic network
slicing concept while addressing many security aspects like
risk management, privacy and secure society.
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G. 5G-MiEdge [Millimeter-Wave Edge Cloud As an Enabler
for 5G Ecosystem] (July 2016 - June 2019)
5G Millimeter-wave Edge cloud as an enabler for the 5G
ecosystem (5G-MiEdge) is a three-year collaborative research
project with eight partners. This includes ICT industries and
universities [350]. It is co-funded by the EU and Japan.
The project develops transmission schemes and protocols of
mmWave access and backhaul for assisting mobile edge cloud
with prefetching and caching, which helps to realize ultra-
high speed and low latency service delivery. 5G security
frameworks and protocols are considered in the project in
order to enable a secure orchestration of communication and
the computation resources of the mmWave edge cloud. The
5G-MiEdge project will use to demonstrate 5G and beyond
features in testbeds in the city of Berlin, and at the 2020 Tokyo
Summer Olympics.
H. 5G Champion [Communication with a Heterogeneous,
Agile Mobile network in the Pyeongchang wInter Olympic
competitioN] (May 2015 - September 2018)
This is a collaborative project of European and South
Korean partners, that comprises ICT industries and research
institutes [351]. The project developed enabling technologies
that were already showcased as a proof of concept at the 2018
Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea.
In this project, one of the main project package is to develop
a secure novel security protocol to use NFV/SDN. Advanced
evolved packet core solutions for efficient system management
with virtualization were developed that uses NFV/SDN in a
secure backhaul architecture as well as a novel SDN-based
Internet protocol security (IPsec) tunnel architecture.
I. IRACON [The Inclusive Radio Communication] (March
2016- February 2020)
IRACON is a COST action EU project on 5G with participa-
tion from mainly European participants and funded by COST
association and EU [352]. IRACON developed an ecosystem
that helps the partner to access experimental facilities of within
the consortium by sharing resources such as connected cards,
ehealth, factories of the future and energy management. This
project has a wide spectrum of research interest such as Radio
Access, IoT, Over-The-Air testing, PHY, NET, IoT for Health
and Localization and tracking. In most of working groups
consider security aspects of their respective research domain.
J. RECORDIS [Resilient communication services protecting
end-user applications from disaster-based failures] (March
2016- February 2020)
This project, is a European level consortium, is to introduce
the techniques of resilient communications, as well as sugges-
tions on how best use and develop communication techniques
to support disruptions and relief operation at European level.
This action offer wide range of solutions to provide resilient
communications to overcome all types of disaster-based dis-
ruptions in networks such as IPv4-based, current Internet, and
future internet and networks.
X. LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
5G communication security is a hot research topic. There
are many open research areas with high levels of challenges
that needs to be tackled in a sophisticated manner. Providing
new solutions must be bounded with certain requirements and
restrictions like low complexity and reliability. This section
briefly discusses lessons learned from related work and pos-
sible future directions for several 5G security communication
systems.
A. Mobile Network Security Landscape
1) Lessons Learned: It is noticeable that the security
challenge according to the provided 5G security landscape
is extremely high. A lot of research challenges due to new
technological enhancement have been observed. Along with
the ongoing stuff, it has increased the risk of threats especially
for cybercrimes, political and personal threats. New threat pro-
tection model based on CIA will be useful. Some centralized
policies may also be helpful to control the access of the overall
system. However, this is not enough at all. There are a lot
of security threats that requires special attention before the
implementation of 5G.
2) Future Directions: For the implementation of 5G com-
munication landscape, requirements of amendments lead in
various future directions in the system. The details of the
types of attacks are given in the section II. Fig. 26 gives a
brief overview for the types of existing and new types of
attacks as a brief overview of future work. Fig. 26 also lists the
possible attacks on centralized policy and visibility. All type
of attacks need equal attention to provide a secure landscape
in the advanced technology.
Along with the existing technologies, IoT is a new tech-
nology where all the devices are connected with each other in
the form of the completely smart world. For IoT security there
are a lot of open research areas including the establishment
of high accuracy detection for mobile malwares and the
Zero-day detection. A number of authors intend to intend to
enhance IoT security for 5G communication system. Authors
of [353] aimed to create a secure system for different CPANs
and their secure network management. With the developed
component authors of [77] offers to improve the authorization,
authentication and other basic goals particularly for IoT.
Implementation of AI will be helpful in providing fast autho-
rization, authentication and trust development between each
IoT device. AI system security will perhaps provide high
system security. In addition to the research of security system
with AI, researchers must also consider the security threats
based on AI.
B. Security Challenges in the Access Control
1) Lessons Learned: There are a number of techniques
proposed to improve the access control. Due to high and decent
demand for 5G technology, the existing work is not sufficient
as we believe that the content access requires access rights and
authentication from an always-online server, which is quite
difficult in many of 5G use-cases. In addition, access right
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Fig. 26. Types of Evolved security Threats for 5G Networks.
revocation is an another issue of the state-of-the-proposals.
Hence, the access control needs a proper attention especially
in terms of its security, access rights and access revocations.
It must also be noted that the requirement of quick access
to the system will be important especially in industries and
hospital in terms of IoT technology. Therefore, the access to
the system must not be critical, delayed and fulfill the security
requirements.
2) Future Directions: Researchers provided some of the
new solutions in this area. As a future work the technique
proposed in [128] can be improved to decentralized group
initialization. According to [128], the JSS protocol efficiency
can also be improved in terms of communication and the
requirement of a reliable communication channel. Noticeably,
a lot of work for access control is done for D2D. For a secure
access control, existing techniques primarily used encryption,
authentication and secret key sharing. However, the demand
for 5G live implementation still needs a lot of effort and critical
thinking.
C. Security Challenges Related to SDN/SDMN
1) Lessons Learned: SDN and SDMN are the current hot
research topics for 5G communication security. Researchers
still did not focus on the deep security schemes for SDN and
SDMN. However, new breakthrough techniques are required
in this area with the adoption of SDN and SDMN in the 5G
communication networks.
Authors of [51] suggested the idea of developing a new
mechanism to control state transition and storage inside the
switch of a SDN data plane and implementation level verifi-
cation methods for the security of inconsistency vulnerability.
According to the authors of [161], SDN controller cluster
will require a distributed security data storage scheme in
future. Improvement in existing SDN and SDMN techniques
are mandatory for achieving the target of future technology.
Authors of [160] reflected various aspects of SDN security
in detail including the improved security for ALL-ELEMENT
threat model and the designing of modularized SDN regulators
in the control domain.
2) Future Directions: Employing AI and ML approaches
guarantee a softwarized security mechanisms to be deployed
with 5G related technologies in conjunction with SDN such
as NFV, MEC, and NS. Moreover, honeypots deployed with
AI and ML platform can act as cyber defenders for deceiving
the attackers in MEC systems. 5G networks are very likely
to use multiple SDN controllers in the core. The efficient
synchronization of security policies across multiple SDN con-
trollers is needed to be addressed. Moreover, it is necessary
to secure the communication between SDN controllers (East-
West Interface) with proper security mechanism. Use of IPsec
tunneling is one possibility to offer the required level of
security for SDN East-West Interface.
D. MEC and Cloud Related Security Issues
1) Lessons Learned: MEC and cloud computing are the
topics of high attention to many 5G researchers and scientists.
Although lots of security solutions are available for cloud
computing, not many security solutions are available for MEC.
In 5G networks, the edge of the mobile network is the ingress
access point to all the mobile network users and the services
emanated in the RAN. This critical juncture is the weakest
point of the entire network in terms of security. Core network
elements have higher levels of security than the egde devices
in both cyber and physical levels. Moreover, the security
of the virtualized MEC platforms is still a gray area due
to lesser deployments. Vulnerabilities and attacks plausible
on Virtual Machines (VMs) are unique and cause significant
consequences to the MEC system.
A number of authors provided security solutions for the
network security. The efficient orchestration of existing diverse
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security mechanism is suggested by the authors of [197] that
requires the universal view of available security solutions for
the proper integration. Authors of [196] aimed to integrate
block-chain technology in the proposed scheme. Authors of
[194], aimed to further explore their proposed scheme of
reputation-assisted optimization in DREAMS.
2) Future Directions: One of the most important security
aspects related to MEC is to identify the treat vectors in a MEC
systems. It is necessary to identify the vulnerability points in
MEC systems and the nature of these threats associate with
these vectors. Such a work can identify the possible existing
security solutions that can be used to mitigate these attack.
Due to the dynamic nature of MEC based applications
such as autonomous driving cars, industrial internet, AR/VR
applications, a high level of AI/ML based solutions may be
required for the provisioning of security at the edge devices in
MEC. Moreover, big data analysis in MEC and cloud networks
requires serious attention due to possibly high vulnerability
and complexity of the system.
Moreover, osmotic computing [354] is a novel initiative
introduced to achieve a seamless migration of edge and cloud
computing infrastructures. The osmotic computing concept can
be also utilize to deploy coherent security policies common to
the edge and cloud data centres.
In addition, authors of [201], aimed to deploy ACPC for P2P
storage cloud system and the design of particular scheduling
schemes for trustworthy peers in a real-world scenario. For
better trade-off authors of [204] aimed the possible data set
combination in different dimensions. Authors of [199] targets
to integrate conjunctive and disjunctive multi-keywords search
in the proposed scheme as a future work for MEC systems.
E. Network Function Virtualization
1) Lessons Learned: Security in NFV has a significant
impact on its adaptability in 5G network. Security will be
largely impacting the system resiliency and the overall quality
of the offered services in NFV based 5G network. Each NFVI
component, i.e. NFV MANO, VNFs, VMs, hypervisors and
physical hardware vulnerable to a different set of security
challenges that pose threats to the whole NFVI. Therefore,
different security mechanism should be used here. It is im-
portant to understand, NFVI is vulnerable to traditional cyber
attacks, virtual element based attacks and physical attacks. Fig.
27 summarizes these generic security threats in NFV [355].
2) Future Directions: The security of NFV based 5G sys-
tems can be improved by using latest Machine Learning (ML)
techniques. The existing policy-based security approaches
used in NFV systems are tending to favor deductive reasoning
by building models of reality and analyzing the models based
on logical rules. However, the scalability of this system is lim-
ited due to complexity. This approach does not perform well in
complex, dynamic and large systems such as 5G networks [3].
To mitigate this issue, an alternative way is to find truth from
observation data and inductive reasoning. Recent past years,
ML techniques have achieved rapid advancement in Big data
handling domain. Novel ML based NFV Security services can
be developed to improve the observation data and inductive
reasoning. Thus, ML has potential to help NFV-based systems
to better perform and protect. ML can enable autonomous
operations of security mechanism in NFV systems. Within an
abstracted and service API-oriented system, ML techniques
can be used to analyze real-time data to fine-tune optimiza-
tion parameters of the overall resource management scheme.
Moreover, the ML system can adapt to load spikes (e.g.,
during a DDoS attack) with autonomous responses by learning
from long-term operational data collected by human expert
operators. Moreover, ML algorithms can be used for anomaly
detection and learning latent structures or patterns from net-
work activities. Thus, it can be used in discovery of invariants
in functional, operational, causal and other relationships are
crucial in many complex cyber-physical systems such as 5G
networks.
Moreover, NFV can be used as a tool to improve the security
of 5G networks. Specially, the added benefits of NFV such
as flexibility and scalability can help to improve the incident
response time, provides better resiliency against DDoS attacks.
For instance, NFV can enables on-demand firewalling and
IDS/ IPS to block or reroute malicious traffic. However the
design of such dynamic NFV based security mechanism are
yet to explored.
One of the critical issues in NFV is the tempering the VNF
image. It is comparably easy to tamper the VNF images during
migration to VMs. Within few seconds, it is possible to insert
bugs such a malware into a VNF image file while it is being
uploaded to an image database or being transferred from an
image database to a compute node. In order to identify such
tempering attempts, VNF images can be cryptographically
signed and verified during launch time. This can be solved by
setting up some signing authority and instruct the hypervisor
to verify the signature of VNF image before the launch.
Moreover, the remote attestation technique can be used to
remotely verify the trust status of a NFV platform. The
blockchain can be used as a technology to design such remote
attestation systems.
Finally, Fig. 28 summarizes other security challenges in
NFV [355] which are needed to be address in future 5G
networks.
F. Network Slicing Related Security Issues
1) Lessons Learned: Network Slicing is rather a new tech-
nology in domain of network softwarization concepts. Most of
the current research work were focusing on architectural and
the implementation aspects of network slicing in 5G. Research
focusing on solving the security issues related to slicing yet
to be done.
2) Future Directions: Several security mechanisms must
be implemented to achieve a secure network slicing system.
However, these security mechanisms must be coordinated
and securely communicate to ensure the reduce the security
overhead and impact of security mechanism. To achieve this
goal, allocation of an independent network slice for security is
beneficial. For instance, security related communication such
as authentication messages, firewall updates, security policy
updates can be transported over this slice. In addition, network
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monitoring and security incident handling systems can be run
on top of this security slice to make sure the proper operation
of the network.
A dedicated security slice can ensure the end to end supply
chain security of the systems. For instance, security related
services such as security service management, SIEM, secu-
rity monitoring, security service change management, cryp-
tographic service, authentication and access control, security
auditing and security service life cycle management can be
implemented on top of this security slice. When a security
slice is available, resources allocated for security services can
be dynamically change. More importantly, it can ensure the
availability of network resources for security.
In 5G networks, a network slice can be extended over
multiple domains. As NS is used to set up, torn down or altered
resources dynamically an on-demand basis, then the presence
of orchestration is mandatory. To operate this function securely
and smoothly, security policies have to be extended in to
multiple domains. Thus, orchestrating security policies across
multiple network domains also becomes important to ensuring
the overall security of individual network slices.
G. Privacy
1) Lessons Learned: The 5G will likely be a fabric for
the next generation of networks, for instances IoT, smart
cities, industries, vehicles, etc. In such networks, an enormous
quantity of data will be produced by the users, devices,
applications, and machines. This (raw) data will be aggregated,
stored, analyzed, processed, and fused for many different
purposes including cross-borders. Moreover, this data not only
belongs to an individual consumer but also to the citizens,
societies, applications, verticals, organizations, and so on. In
a typical network, the end-users’ privacy risks emanate from
the application data that will be communicated as plaintext
in the network. Many of real data-leaks have proven that the
end-users’ privacy has been at high risks, and that data-leaks
can be taken as the lessons from the past. Therefore, privacy
has been one of the major issues in the 5G network.
2) Future Directions: As the 5G technologies are still at
early stage, several future research directions can be explored
in order to address the privacy issues. Specifically, it is possible
to design 5G technologies that provide privacy protection from
the origin of the data or embed privacy into each device,
application, vertical, and service. The future research must
focus on defining a general architecture for 5G privacy, in-
cluding Privacy-by-Design (PbD). In addition, from the larger
perspective of the 5G verticals, further topics can be explored,
e.g., location privacy-based solutions for the MEC. In MEC,
typically the data is processed at the edge devices and these
devices are controlled and monitored by the operators. Privacy
solutions may have direct impact on 5G applications such as
IoT, healthcare, and smart cities, however, these solutions are
still not adequately explored under the real world conditions.
JOURNAL OF LATEX IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS, JULY 2019 41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NFV 
Security 
Challenges
Hypervisor
Elastic NW
Dynamic 
NW
Multi-
Domain 
Policy
Integrity
Service 
Insertion
Inspection 
(State)
Scalability
Multi-cloud 
Security
Security 
Reporting
• Elastic network boundaries 
o Same network fabric for multiple functions  
o Placement of physical controls less applicable 
o Unclear boundaries 
o VLANs are not necessarily secure 
o Physical segregation may still be required 
• Dynamic workloads:  
o NFV enables agile and dynamic capabilities 
& dynamic NW topology 
o Traditional security models are static & 
unable to adapt & evolve dynamically 
o Security services into NFV rely on overlay 
models that cross vendor boundaries 
• Multi-Domain Security Policy Management 
o Multiple administrators with vertically & 
horizontally overlapping administrative 
domains  
o Policy / authority conflict management  
o Responsibility and liability distributed 
among many overlapping trust and 
administrative realms 
• Hypervisor Dependencies 
o Security vulnerabilities in Hypervisor code 
o Diligent patching 
o Underlying architecture: resource contesting, packets 
flow within the network fabric;  
o various types of encryption; DPI functionality, etc 
• Integrity of VNF & policy 
o End-to-end integrity and accountability of 
policies and VNF configurations in hybrid 
multi-cloud and multi-operator 
environments  
o More challenging with Virtualized inter-
cloud network functions 
• Security service insertion & on-boarding 
o Elastic, transparent networks (fabric intelligently routes packets)  
o  Logically and physically inline deployment of security controls is insufficient for NFV 
o Security services in NfV may be layered into the hypervisor 
o Complex insertion procedures for security services that are not already layered into the hypervisor 
• Scalability of available resources 
o Dedicating cores to workloads and 
network resources enables resource 
consolidation. 
o Pervasive security controls 
(DPI,NGFW,Crypto,etc) need  
significant compute resources. 
• (Stateful) Inspection enablement: 
o Stateful inspection is preferred today  
o Security controls cannot deal with the asymmetries 
created by multiple, redundant NW paths in NFV 
o Asymmetric flows challenge stateful devices that 
need to see every packet to provide access controls 
• Multi-Cloud (3rd party) security:  
o Consistent enforcement security 
functions in hybrid multi-clouds 
o On-board and orchestrate 3rd party 
services 
o Co-existing security enforcement 
mechanisms (hypervisor plug-in, 
VMOS, network proxy, gateway) 
• Security Incident Reporting & Secure 
Information Sharing:  
o How to assure end-to-end integrity of 
incident information & traceability of 
security incident 
o How to preserve security function 
isolation & confidential sharing that still 
allows security analytics 
o EU cybersecurity directive: Security 
incident reporting structure & 
specification 
Fig. 28. Security Challenges in NFV [355]
Moreover, another approaches, for instance software defined
privacy (SDP) based solutions can be extended into the 5G
network [313]. The SDP-based solutions are based on privacy
policies, which are defined by the privacy officers [356].
However, how to manage and store any data with various
policy mechanisms are still under study.
5G has different stakeholders (such as a mobile network,
ISP, CSP) and multiple verticals (such as healthcare, smart
grid, transport and other critical infrastructure). All these
entities may work collaboratively but may have different
objectives. As a result, more efforts on the privacy regulations
are highly required at different levels such as government,
industry and consumer level.
H. Security Monitoring and Management
1) Lessons Learned: The main issue of current monitor-
ing systems is the lack of visibility and controls on NFV
based virtual network entities. Moreover the heterogeneity of
different virtual entities makes many performance assessment
applications ineffective. Therefore, it is important to study the
impact of virtualization technologies such as SDN, NFV and
cloud computing on existing monitoring systems. For instance,
5G network monitoring applications should be able to monitor
and manage virtual entities.
2) Future Directions: One possibility to monitor these vir-
tual entities is to monitor inter-VNF communication channel.
However, it might not be possible to monitor inter-VNF com-
munication under current specifications. Current OpenStack
specifications provide blackprints to conduct the inter-VNF
communication, however these specifications are not yet part
of the current release [290].
Fig. 29 proposes how to extend the SDM architecture
proposed in [290], [291], [294], [295] to use in 5G architec-
ture. Here, we propose to add Software Defined Monitoring
Controller (SDMC) as a NF in 5G core network. Virtual probes
are deployed in every VNF in addition to the physical probes
in physical hardware components.
Fig. 29. New 5G Software Defined Monitoring (SDM) architecture.
The operational cost is another important aspect to consider
in 5G monitoring system. The novel monitoring mechanisms
and technologies need to cope with ever-changing contexts
and trade-offs between the monitoring costs and the benefits
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involved.
On the other hand, current SDN based network topologies
including 5G networks are no longer as static as they were
when their implementation was only physical. These SDN
networks allow a very dynamic configuration of routes, fire-
walls, filters and converters. It is also important to consider
the backward compatibility for non-SDN based legacy mobile
networks such as 4G-LTE. Thus is challenging to design
5G monitoring systems that can tackle the coexistence of
legacy network components, software network components
and virtualized network functions. The new 5G monitoring
systems should be able to show a unified view of the network
topology. To build such a unified view, it is required the
Network Descriptor module which could collect and normalize
network data from a wide range of sources as SDN controllers,
networks emulators and legacy infrastructure. Moreover, it is
also necessary to build a tool or a topology viewer which can
represent the information has been collected from the network.
Moreover, significant improvements are needed in the fol-
lowing main areas to design an effective monitoring system
in 5G networks. First, new Information extraction methods
and techniques have to be designed to deal with virtualization.
These methods able to obtain information on traffic flows, pro-
files, and properties by means of extracted protocol metadata,
measurements, data mining and machine learning techniques.
Second, the monitoring methods have to tackle the scalability
and performance issues. Especially, the deployment of the 5G
monitoring entities and the location of the observation points
have to be carefully selected to assure the scalability. More-
over, monitoring tools should be selected to obtain the best
balance between performance, cost and completeness of the
monitoring outputs. Moreover, different hardware acceleration
and packet pre-processing technologies can be integrated with
the 5G monitoring systems to obtain highly optimized results.
Thirdly, 5G monitoring system should support the Hetero-
geneity. The monitoring system should be able to analysis
of different control and user plane traffic flows over the 5G
network domains. It should also support the new interfaces
between 5G entities and existing pre-5G networks entities.
Fourthly, 5G monitoring systems should support dynamicity.
Due to virtualized networks and applications in 5G network,
5G networks are highly dynamic. Changes in the network
become quite easy and frequent in 5G network. Monitoring
solutions need to be able to adapt to these changes to provide
the proper operation.
I. Security Standardization
1) Lessons Learned: As of today, the functional nature of
the 5G network for different stakeholders including consumers,
industries and governments is underway. Through distinct
working groups have been working on different topics and
stakeholders in 5G security standards, yet no peculiar security
standard for 5G network security is in use. Therefore, one
take-away from such situation is that the integration and
cooperation between different working groups, globally, are
highly required to become reality for 5G network.
2) Future Directions: 5G security standards working
groups, such as ITU, ETSI, 3GPP, oneM2M, 5G PPP, IEEE,
IETF, NVF, ONF, are working on a large number of security
issues. These groups are developing security recommenda-
tions, technical specifications, defining security architecture
and principles, M2M security specifications, identifying se-
curity risks, etc. It is a promising initiative, but more precise
5G standards and security mechanisms (authentication, confi-
dentiality, integrity, availability) are required to build such a
mammoth scale 5G network. It is clear that more efforts are
required to develop a large number of standards to make the
5G function efficiently and securely.
J. PHY Layer Security
1) Lessons Learned: For the current literature review, no-
ticeably several researchers have done a lot of research for
PLS. A number of algorithms exists for high security provi-
sion. Most of the latest work used AN for better security of the
system. Table IX shows a list of goals and achievements made
by several authors in multiple ways. The newly implemented
technique somehow opposes cryptography in PLS. It is also
noticeable that physical layer is the most vulnerable layer for
5G technology. Since the entire world will face a new type of
technology in terms of, smart or connected world. Hence, there
is high amount of security threat to more connected devices.
Internet of everything will bring connectivity for everything.
Hence, every thing will face some security threats.
2) Future Directions: For the physical layer security of
NOMA, OFDMA, MIMO, UAV, D2D and mmWave most of
the authors worked on PLS without cryptography. However,
for achieving challenging 5G security targets joint consider-
ation of cryptography design and key assisted physical layer
security will provide best security scheme. Better implementa-
tion of AS and jammers is necessary for achievement of QoS.
Implementation of AI security or machine learning technique
will definitely improve the system security. Authors in [357]
combined M-NOMA with genetic algorithm. It will be helpful
for better system security.
Security in UAVs and mmWave still has not received the
significant attention of many researchers. Most of the security
research is done in terms of threat detection, response to
intruders reaction, maximization of secrecy rate and cryp-
tography. There are many already proposed secure network
scheme, used for other Physical layer technologies, which can
be implemented on UAVs and mmWave. Further, practical
implementation of many techniques requires consideration.
FPGA implementation is a better tool for the proof of the-
oretical work.
According to [211], For different variation including the
block size and the activation ratio, the proposed OFDM-SIS
scheme’s secrecy performance requires investigation and Over-
all system achievement including secrecy and other dominant
functionalities can be maximized by exploiting the degree of
freedom given by the proposed OFDM-SIS scheme. In [52],
security techniques for overall QoS, limitations of 5G, cross-
layer, and content aware PLS are considered as some of the
future directions. In future authors of cite he2017design intent
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to extend the technique to MIMO secure NOMA, prevent the
privacy amongst user due to SICs performed at each user, and
to code domain NOMA. According to the authors of [236],
optimization of power allocation coefficients could be a future
work for CR NOMA security.
According to the authors of [220], exploring the system
under robust allocations of resources under uncertainty channel
models is one of the future work. In addition, the system
can utilize multiple antennas for the better performance of
the system.
It would be of interest to study the deployment of PHY
security in industrial control systems, merging modest cryp-
tographic approaches with PHY-layer methods can augment
general security and economical. PHY-layer authentication is
an indispensable way for averting Probing-free spoofing attack
in the industrial control systems – this helps to guarantee that
only the legitimate signals are decoded [358]. Thus, deploying
PHY layer techniques and tailoring them for industrial control
system stands as a new research avenue. In recent literature
[359], [360] resort to machine learning techniques to improve
channel state information based authentication. This is indeed
a new research direction to use artificial intelligent to improve
the PHY layer security schemes.
Industry 4.0 entails the current inclination of automation
and data exchange in industrial technologies; cyber-physical
systems, the Internet of things, cloud computing and intelligent
computing [361]. Integration of PHY layer security with
Industry 4.0 opens up a new horizon for wireless PHY research
community.
K. SDN-NFV Security
1) Lessons Learned: 5G networks are fundamentally based
on SDN and NFV. On one hand, SDN/NFV could solve the
most of the security limitations in 4G-LTE networks. On the
other hand, most of the SDN/NFV security challenges are
also applicable to 5G networks. Thus, 5G networks will have
additional security requirements, such as SDN controller secu-
rity, hypervisor security, orchestrator security, cloud security
as well as security under multi-tenancy settings. Software
errors such as misconfigurations of VNFs can lead to inter-
federated conflicts that can jeopardize the whole network. In
addition to security challenges and opportunities associated
with SDN/NFV networks, 5G networks tackle the security
challenges in the various section of the network. For instance,
RAN should include additional security measures to prevent
DDoS via smart phones, resource exhaustion attacks and mis-
use infrastructure sharing. Moreover, authentication schemes
such as EAP should be modified not only to support URLLC
applications with less than 1 ms delay, but also authenticate
millions of connected devices (i.e IoT) simultaneously.
2) Future Directions: One possible solution is to mitigate
the quickly identify security treats or attacks on 5G networks
and try to limit the impacts those attacks have on customers
and other core network elements. NFV offers better monitoring
features such as distribute monitoring functions than SDN. On
the other hand, SDN offers flexibility to divert traffic flows at
switch level. Thus combine use of these features can be used to
quickly identify and limit or block malicious traffic flows much
closer to the source of attacks. Due the tremendous increment
in data traffic volume and subscribers, it is necessary to
design automated solutions by using novel AI/ML techniques.
Moreover, new interfaces and shared databases should be
established between SDN and NFV platforms to enable the
cooperation.
L. Key Management and Secure Communication
1) Lessons Learned: Secure communication between dif-
ferent control entities is required to operate reliable and
efficient mobile network. The efficient integration of key man-
agement entities with 5G core network elements is necessary
to enable such secure communication in 5G. Moreover, current
secure communication systems need frequent key exchanges
and security parameter updates with these core security ele-
ments. However, the security maintenance overhead (i.e. band-
width, battery life, processing power, communication cost) is
increasing in 5G due to increment of control entities (e.g.
number of BSs, core network elements and subscribers). Thus,
future secure communication systems should be more efficient
than current systems to mitigate this challenge.
2) Future Directions: In that aspects, Quantum security
can be the one of the evolutionary tide of network security
and cryptography areas. When the adversaries become uncon-
querable with the quantum level powers, the existing public-
key encryption and signature schemes will no longer provide
secure connectivity. The security of quantum cryptography can
be proven mathematically without imposing any restrictions
on the abilities of an eavesdropper. Longer symmetric keys
derived and distributed by quantum cryptographic approaches
will ensure the lifetime security of many IoT devices. This
will also extend the battery life of the devices and minimize
the network overhead by reducing frequent handshaking for
the key establishment process. Furthermore, the quantum
security can be exploited for managing secure identity, mutual
authentication of the devices, appropriate certification and
qualification, and power efficient algorithms and policies.
In addition, some of the key management entities can be
implemented at the edge of the network by utilizing MEC ca-
pabilities. This can reduce the security related communication
overhead over 5G backhual network. This approach will be
paving the way for the delay critical IoT and 5G applications
as well.
M. Other related/future technologies to enhance security and
privacy in 5G
1) Context-Aware Security: With the development of ubiq-
uitous computing, it is expected that context aware commu-
nication and networking will dominate in beyond 5G era.
Many of the future apps need reliable access to various
sources of context information. For instance, precise location
information on both indoors and outdoors will be required to
offer multimedia delivery every time and everywhere, rapid
file sharing in the form of cellular broadcasting and wireless
car video services. Future mobile communication networks
(beyond 5G) are also very frequently integrated with IoT/IoE
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(Internet of Everything) networks to provide wide range of
novel services. Thus, at one end, these heterogeneous kinds
of networks will be considered crucial for improving context
awareness but on the other end, security and privacy risks will
also emerge. Adversaries can target such networks more easily
to launch various security attacks. Also as users are naturally
interested in protecting their privacy and thus only the required
information shall be collected for the purposes of context-
aware operation. Therefore, context awareness based security
mechanism requires intelligent and controlled solutions by the
network operator and other involved stockholders.
2) AI for Security: The existing security mechanisms for
mobile networks are either human or machine-centric. The
human centric systems rely on the manual configuration of
humans and machine on centric systems rely automated tech-
niques such as anomaly detection. However, such system still
makes fault negativity which might need human intervention
at the end to fix those issues. Moreover, future digital systems
will face more automated and advance attacks (e.g. AI-enabled
hacking) due the advancement of communication technology
and machine learning techniques. To prevent such attacks, 5G
need sophisticated and intelligent security solutions. Ironically,
AI is the best hope to combat against these attacks. The
development in AI, i.e. cognitive algorithms motivate us to
use AI for fulfilling the stringent delay and extremely sen-
sitive security requirements. AI machines intelligently select
data, transform it into meaningful information and then make
decisions of controlling processes. Even further, AI algorithms
and models such as Markov models, neural networks, genetic
algorithms, and machine learning techniques can be used to
find configuration errors, security vulnerabilities and threats.
However, machine learning, fuzzy logic and other tech-
niques related to AI are not sufficient enough to tackle several
advance 5G technology communication technique specially
IoT and Big Data. Therefore, AI techniques needs to be
upgraded in a more sophisticated and acceptable manner to
provide high levels of security to fulfill the required expecta-
tions.
3) Security Orchestration and Automation: The use of
security orchestration is mandatory 5G networks where the
operator needs to control both virtual and physical network
segments. The primary goal of security orchestration is remove
the need for manually configure with human interaction.
Human central security management is no longer feasible due
to high dynamicity of the future mobile network. The security
orchestrator will be responsible for deployment, configuration,
maintenance, monitoring and life cycle management all secu-
rity functions in a softwarized 5G mobile network. It should be
able to ensure the end-to-end security by automatically align-
ing the security policies inside the both virtual and physical
network segments. ETSI ISG group has already defined the
security orchestrator for NFV systems. The group has also
defined different tasks of the security orchestrator in NFV
systems and the required interfaces to interact with the existing
ETSI NFV components such as NFV orchestrator, the VNF
Managers, the Element Managers and the Virtual Infrastructure
Managers. Since, several other network softwarization tech-
niques such as SDN, MEC and NS will also be a part of the 5G
network and the functions of security orchestration should be
extended to manage the security of other systems as well. The
integrated role of security orchestrator in 5G systems should
be defined along with the new interfaces to communicate with
different 5G technologies.
4) Blockchain: For some researchers and industry, the
blockchain technology is considering as one of the most
important innovations in this century. It might be true since a
recent market study estimates blockchain will add 3.1 trillion
Euro in business value by 2030 [362]. Blockchain has already
adopted in one of major 5G domain which is IoT.
Due the popularity of the IoT systems, billions of smart
devices will be connected by 5G network. This will raise
serious concerns on security, privacy, connectivity, service
provisioning and data storage ares. Most of the present day
IoT systems are using centralized cloud based architecture.
A centralized cloud is used for data processing as well as
storage. However, the current centralized cloud architecture
will be difficult to scale up to satisfy the demands of future
5G IoT systems. To solve this issues, the decentralized and
consensus-driven Blockchain has identified as a viable solu-
tion. Blockchain can play a significant role in IoT domain
[363]–[365]. Blockchain can be used to enable secure data
sharing, secure authentication and high privacy in 5G IoT
Systems.
On the other hand, several analysis has estimated that
global IoT market is expected to grow up to 457 billion
Euro by 2020. The combination of IoT and Blockchain will
disrupt existing processes across variety of industries including
manufacturing, agriculture, banking, transportation, shipping,
energy, the financial sector and healthcare. However, it is
still in its infancy. Moreover, the combination with IoT still
requires essential insights with respect to concrete application
domains, performance, scalability, security and privacy issues.
In this regard, the use of smart contracts will help to design
more dynamic and self-executing security policies. Specifi-
cally, researchers should be targeting of designing blockchain
based mechanisms to support identity management, access
control systems, anonymity and privacy, and trust models.
In addition, blockchain can be used in cloud computing
systems to enable security, privacy and automation [366]–
[369]. Since 5G is promoting novel MEC based solutions
which is proposing to move cloud computing features to the
edge, blockchain will be important in MEC domain as well.
Specially, blockchain can fuel the integration of MEC IoT
integration in 5G by offering a high level of security and
privacy. Some research work related to blockchain based Fog
computing systems were proposed to improve the security and
privacy [370]–[375]. Thus, blockchain can play a vital role
in enhancing security of not only MEC but also other 5G
technologies such as SDN, NFV and network slicing.
In addition, blockchain can be used to enhance the security
of 5G network by mitigating roaming frauds. A roaming fraud
occurs when a fake mobile subscriber accesses the resources
of the home network via the visitor network. In this case, the
home network operator is unable to charge the subscriber for
the services provided. However, he is is obliged to pay the
visitor network for the roaming services. Most of the roaming
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fraud exploits due to long detection time and long response
time due data transfer via third party data clearing houses.
A blockchain could be implemented between every pair of
operators which have a roaming agreement to speed up the
detection and response times by eliminating third party data
clearing houses. Moreover, blockchain can be used to offer
identity-as-a-service to 5G verticals such as smart grids, health
and other critical infrastructures. However, these areas are yet
to be explored.
5) Security-by-Design (SbD): SbD is an approach that will
consider the security concerns already at the beginning of a
design a product, service or software. SbD can secure the
foundation of the product or service by minimizing impact
anticipated security vulnerabilities. Many software systems
i.e Amazon Web Services (AWS) is using SbD to automates
security controls and streamlines auditing. In current software
systems, the current SbD approaches can offer benefits such
as establishment reliable operation of controls and enabling
continuous and real-time auditing. However, the core concept
SbD is not limited to software systems. It can be extended
to any system including 5G mobile networks. For instance,
SbD approach can be along with NFV, SDN, MEC and NS
systems. In this way, SbD approach can reduce the impact of
know attacks on the system.
6) Security-as-a-Service: 5G networks provide services for
a large variety of verticals including smart grids, transporta-
tion, health care, smart city, and future factories. However,
most of these vertical operators will not have up-to-date secu-
rity expertise to manage all security aspects of their network.
Therefore, they must obtain a wide range of security services
by security service providers. In this content, Security-as-a-
Service (SaaS) is an approach where service providers can
offer security services to cooperate customers.Typically, these
security services are ranging from authentication, security
monitoring intrusion detection, penetration testing and security
event management, among others. As typical vertical operators
do not have expertise in both network security and network
softwarization, SaaS concept can offer easy integration route
for them. This is an interesting research domain that has
possibility to provide network security as a SaaS solution.
XI. CONCLUSION
The landscape of 5G network is continuously evolving, rais-
ing an increasing number of security threats at different levels
and applications. This paper has explored 5G security threat
via panoramic reviews and discussions based on available
literature and have tried to provide a relevant understanding
on the security issues. We have explored the comprehensive
investigation on 5G security model, next generation threat
landscape for 5G, IoT threat landscapes, and threat analysis
in 5G networks. Our survey covered a holistic investigations
on security challenges in key 5G security domains, including
authentication, access control, communication security and
encryption. The survey had also highlighted the identified
security issues associated with 5G key technologies i.e. Soft-
ware Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtu-
alization (NFV), cloud computing, Multi-access Edge Com-
puting (MEC) and Network Slicing (NS) concepts. Then, the
survey included a horizontal analysis of security monitoring
and privacy aspects on 5G network. Finally, a comprehensive
list of future directions and open challenges had included to
encourage future research on 5G security domain.
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